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FOREWORD 
 
This NASA Technical Standard is published by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) to provide uniform engineering and technical requirements for processes, procedures, 
practices, and methods endorsed as standard for models and simulations (M&S) developed and used 
in NASA programs and projects, including requirements for selection, application, and design 
criteria of an item.  This NASA Technical Standard was originally developed to respond to Action 4 
from the 2004 report “A Renewed Commitment to Excellence,” with consideration also given to 
related findings as identified in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report.  This 
first revision continues to evolve the concepts of the Baseline version from experiences in its 
implementation. 
 
This NASA Technical Standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers and 
Facilities and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical 
requirement.  It may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and other contractors only to the 
extent specified or referenced in applicable contracts. 
 
This NASA Technical Standard establishes requirements and recommendations for the 
development and use (or operation) of M&S, as well as the analysis and presentation of the 
results from M&S.  This also includes the proper training of M&S practitioners and the 
identification of recommended practices, while ensuring the credibility of the results from M&S 
is assessed and clearly conveyed, especially for critical decisions. 
 
Requests for information should be submitted via “Feedback” at https://standards.nasa.gov.  
Requests for changes to this NASA Technical Standard should be submitted via MSFC Form 4657, 
Change Request for a NASA Engineering Standard. 
 
 
Original Signed By:  07-13-2016 
Ralph R. Roe, Jr.  Approval Date 
NASA Chief Engineer   
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STANDARD FOR MODELS AND SIMULATIONS 
 
1. SCOPE 
 
This NASA Technical Standard establishes uniform practices in modeling and simulation to 
ensure essential requirements are applied to their design, development, and use, while ensuring 
acceptance criteria are defined by the program/project and approved by the responsible Technical 
Authority. 
 
This NASA Technical Standard provides an approved set of requirements, recommendations, 
and criteria with which models and simulations (M&S) may be developed, accepted, and used in 
support of NASA activities.  As the M&S disciplines employed and application areas involved 
are broad, the common aspects of M&S across all NASA activities are addressed.  The 
discipline-specific details of a given M&S should be obtained from relevant recommended 
practices. 
 
1.1  Purpose 
 
The primary purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to reduce the risks associated with 
M&S-influenced decisions by ensuring the complete communication of the credibility of M&S 
results.  The requirements and recommendations contained herein provide a basic set of best 
practices applicable to any M&S.  This NASA Technical Standard achieves this by establishing a 
minimum set of requirements for the key elements related to M&S, including development, 
maintenance, operation, results analysis, training, credibility assessment, and reporting.  This 
NASA Technical Standard covers what needs to be accomplished and communicated, not how it 
is to be done.  Discipline-specific recommended practice guides should be consulted for specific 
applications or methodologies. 
 
1.2 Applicability 
 
This NASA Technical Standard: 
 
• Is applicable (relevant and appropriate) to all M&S used by NASA, its contractors, and 
its partners.  
 
• Covers M&S used in design, development, manufacturing, ground operations, and flight 
operations.  
 
• Is highly recommended for M&S used in critical decisions or functions.    
 
Any required application of this NASA Technical Standard is to be specified in 
program/project/organization/office directives and may be tailored (refer to section 1.3 for 
tailoring requirements).  
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[M&S 1] When conflicts exist between this NASA Technical Standard and voluntary consensus 
standards (VCS), this document shall take precedence, except in those cases where the VCS is 
invoked by applicable Government regulation. 
 
This NASA Technical Standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers and 
Facilities and may be cited in contract, program, and other Agency documents as a technical 
requirement.  It may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and other contractors only to the 
extent specified or referenced in applicable contracts. 
 
Verifiable requirement statements are numbered and indicated by the word “shall”; this NASA 
Technical Standard contains 39 requirements. Explanatory or guidance text is indicated in italics 
beginning in section 4. To facilitate requirements selection and verification by NASA programs 
and projects, a Requirements Compliance Matrix is provided in Appendix A. 
 
1.3 Tailoring  
 
[M&S 2] Tailoring of this NASA Technical Standard for application to a specific 
program/project/organization/office shall be formally documented as part of 
program/project/organization/office requirements and approved by the responsible Technical 
Authority in accordance with NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project 
Management Requirements. 
 
2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
 
2.1 General 
 
The document listed in this section contains provisions that constitute requirements of this 
NASA Technical Standard as cited in the text.   
 
2.1.1 [M&S 3] The latest issuances of cited documents shall be used unless otherwise approved 
by the assigned Technical Authority.   
 
2.1.2 [M&S 4] Non-use of specifically designated versions shall be approved by the responsible 
Technical Authority. 
 
The applicable document is accessible at https://standards.nasa.gov, may be obtained directly 
from the Standards Developing Body or other document distributors, or information for 
obtaining the document is provided. 
2.2 Government Documents 
 
 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
 NPR 7120.5 NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 
Requirements  
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2.3 Non-Government Documents 
 
 None. 
 
2.4 Order of Precedence 
 
2.4.1 The requirements and standard practices established in this NASA Technical Standard do 
not supersede or waive existing requirements and standard practices found in other Agency 
documentation. 
 
2.4.2 [M&S 5] Conflicts between this NASA Technical Standard and other requirements 
documents shall be resolved by the responsible Technical Authority. 
 
3. ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
3.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
CM Configuration Management 
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
CPIAC Chemical Propulsion Information Analysis Center 
DoD Department of Defense 
FS Factors of Safety  
GOTS Government-Off-The-Shelf 
HDBK Handbook 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
ISO International Organization for Standardization 
JANNAF Joint Army-Navy-NASA-Air Force  
M&S Model and Simulation; or Models and Simulations 
M&SCO Modeling and Simulation Coordination Office 
Mgt. Management 
MOTS Modified-Off-The-Shelf 
MUF Model Uncertainty Factor 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirements 
Rec. Recommendation 
RPG Recommended Practices Guide 
RWS Real World System 
SAE Society of Automotive Engineers 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
STD Standard 
V&V Verification and Validation 
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VCS Voluntary Consensus Standard 
VV&A Verification, Validation, and Accreditation 
 
3.2 Definitions 
 
The definitions listed below are those used in this document.  Wherever possible, these 
definitions have been taken from official NASA documents.  In some cases, after reviewing 
definitions of interest in the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the 
Department of Defense (DoD) Modeling and Simulation Coordination Office (M&SCO), 
professional society publications, and English language dictionaries, some of these definitions 
were taken or adapted from these sources to achieve the goal and objectives stated in section 1.1.  
Some definitions may have alternate meanings in other documents and disciplines.  
 
Abstraction:  The process of selecting the essential aspects of a source system or referent system to 
be represented in a model or simulation, while ignoring those aspects not relevant to the purpose 
of the model or simulation.  Any modeling abstraction carries with it the assumption that it does 
not significantly affect the intended uses of the M&S. 
 
Accepted Use:  The successful outcome of a Use Assessment designating the M&S is accepted for 
a Proposed Use. 
 
Accuracy:  The closeness of a parameter or variable (or a set of parameters or variables) within a 
model, simulation, or experiment to the true value or the assumed true value. 
 
Actual Use:  The specific purpose and domain of application for which an M&S is being, or was, 
used. 
 
Aleatory Uncertainty:  The inherent variation in the physical system; it is stochastic and 
irreducible without changes to the system or how it operates. 
 
Analysis:  The examination of a situation or problem in order to understand the item in question 
and make appropriate recommendations.  Analysis spans the whole extent of the M&S process 
from the study of the Real World System (RWS) and/or its referents, the gathering and reduction 
of data from the RWS or accepted referents for incorporation into a model, the development of 
simulation scenarios, and the study and reduction of data from use of the M&S into 
recommendations for the RWS. 
 
Artifact:  Any tangible product produced by the project team, e.g., requirements, documents, help 
systems, code, executables, test documentation, test results, and diagrams. 
 
Assumption:  Asserting information as a basis for reasoning about a system.  In modeling and 
simulation, assumptions are taken to simplify or focus certain aspects of a model with respect to 
the RWS or presume values for certain parameters in a model.   
 
Calibration:  The process of adjusting numerical or modeling parameters in the model to improve 
agreement with a referent.  Note: Calibration can also be known as “tuning.” 
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Caveat:  “An explanation to prevent misinterpretation, or a modifying or cautionary detail to be 
considered when evaluating, interpreting, or doing something.” (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/caveat)  
 
Computational Model:  The operational or usable implementation of the conceptual model, 
including all mathematical, numerical, logical, and qualitative representations.  This may also be 
known as “simulation model.” 
 
Conceptual Model:  The collection of abstractions, assumptions, and descriptions of physical 
components and processes representing the reality of interest, which includes the RWS, its 
environment, and their relevant behaviors.  Note: The conceptual model provides the source 
information for conceptual validation with respect to the RWS, model construction, and model 
verification.  It may consist of flow charts, schematic drawings, written descriptions, math models, 
etc., that explain the RWS and its interaction with the surrounding/interfacing environment.  The 
conceptual model should be independent of any specific model implementation. 
 
Conceptual Validation:  The process of determining the degree to which a conceptual model (as 
defined in this NASA Technical Standard) or model design adequately represents the real world 
from the perspective of the intended uses of the model or the simulation. 
 
Configuration Management:  A management discipline applied over the product's life cycle to 
provide visibility into and to control changes to performance and to functional and physical 
characteristics (NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 
Requirements). 
 
Correlated (as in an M&S correlated with a RWS):  The extent to which an M&S and RWS, or 
some aspect of an M&S and RWS, behave similarly due to a particular change in some set of input 
variables, parameters, perturbations, etc. 
 
Credibility:  The quality to elicit belief or trust in M&S results. 
 
Critical Decision:  The selection of a course-of-action related to design, development, 
manufacturing, ground, or flight operations that may significantly impact human safety or mission 
success, as measured by program/project-defined criteria. 
 
Data Pedigree:  A record of traceability from the data's source through all aspects of its 
transmission, storage, and processing to its final form used in the development of an M&S. 
(Any changes from the real-world source data may be of significance to its pedigree.  Ideally, this 
record includes important quality characteristics of the data at every stage of the process.) 
 
Design of Experiments (or Experimental Design):  A series of tests in which purposeful changes 
are made to the input variables of a system or process and the effects on response variables are 
measured.  It is applicable to both physical processes and computer simulation models. 
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Deterministic:  A term describing a system whose time evolution can be predicted exactly.  Note:  
for comparison, see definition of “Probabilistic.” 
 
Domain of Validation:  The region enclosing all sets of model inputs for which the M&S’s 
responses compare favorably with the referent. 
 
Domain of Verification:  The region enclosing all sets of model inputs for which the solution is 
determined to be correct and satisfy requirements for computational accuracy. 
 
Empirical Validation:  The process of determining the degree to which an operating model or 
simulation is or provides an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the 
intended uses of the model or the simulation. 
 
Emulation:  The use of an M&S to reproduce the function or action of another system. 
 
Epistemic Uncertainty:  A lack of knowledge of the quantities or processes identified with the 
system; it is subjective, is reducible, and comprises both model and parameter uncertainty. 
 
Factor of Safety:  A multiplicative factor applied to the parameters of an M&S (that is, in a model, 
in the input to a model, or in the output of a model) to ensure the adequacy of the RWS to meet 
specific requirements (adapted from NASA-STD-5001, Structural Design and Test Factors of 
Safety for Spaceflight Hardware.) 
 
Formal Training:  Instructor-led training of at least the depth of a semester-long university course 
at the advanced undergraduate or graduate level. 
 
Human Safety:  The condition of being protected from death, permanently disabling injury, severe 
injury, and several occupational illnesses. In the NASA context, this refers to safety of the public, 
astronauts, pilots, and the NASA workforce (adapted from NPR 8000.4 and the NASA Safety 
Hierarchy). 
 
Input Pedigree:  A record of traceability from the input data's source through all aspects of its 
transmission, storage, and processing to its final form when using an M&S.  (Any changes from 
the real-world source data may be of significance to its pedigree.  Ideally, this record includes 
important quality characteristics of the data at every stage of the process.) 
 
Intended Use:  The expected purpose and application of an M&S. 
 
Key Input Data:  Input to the model with high relevance to the analysis. 
 
Limits of Operation:  The bounding set of parameters for an M&S, based on the outcomes of 
verification, validation, and uncertainty quantification, beyond which the accuracy, precision, and 
uncertainty of the results are indeterminate. 
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Margin:  The allowances carried in budget, projected schedules, and technical performance 
parameters (e.g., weight, power, or memory) to account for uncertainties and risks (NASA-SP-
2007, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook). 
 
Mathematical Model:  The mathematical equations, boundary values, initial conditions, and 
modeling data needed to describe the conceptual model (adapted from ASME V&V 10, Verification 
and Validation in Computational Solid Mechanics). 
 
Mission Success Criteria:  Specifications against which the program or project will be deemed to 
have achieved operational objectives. 
 
Model:  A description or representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process (adapted from 
Banks (1998).  Note: A model may be constructed from multiple sub-models; the sub-models and 
the integrated sub-models are all considered models.  Likewise, any data that goes into a model are 
considered part of the model. 
 
Modeling:  The act of creating a model, i.e., the act of creating a representation of a system. 
 
Model Capability:  The potential or ability (of a model) to represent an RWS, entity, phenomenon, 
or process. 
 
Model Uncertainty:  Variation in M&S results due to assumptions, formulas, and representations, 
and not due to factors inherent in the RWS. 
 
Model Uncertainty Factor (MUF):  A semi-quantitative (i.e., a quantitative magnitude based on 
past experience rather than data) adjustment, either additive or multiplicative or both, made to the 
results of an M&S-based analysis to account for uncertainty.  Note:  The MUF is also likely to 
have some associated confidence or coverage range. 
 
Numerical Errors:  Errors traceable to various sources, including but not limited to, floating point 
precision, inherent in all computer systems and leading to round off, underflow, and overflow; 
truncation of infinite series expansions; and approximations of exact solutions inherent in all 
numerical methods, e.g., approximation of derivatives and integrals by algebraic operations on 
sampled continuous functions.  
 
Permissible Use:  The purposes for which an M&S is formally allowed. 
 
Probabilistic:  Pertaining to non-deterministic events, the outcomes of which are described by a 
measure of likelihood.  
 
Proposed Use:  A desired specific application of an M&S. 
 
Real World System:  The reality of interest a model is representing, which may include relevant 
operating conditions or aspects of its environment.  Note:  The RWS may interact with its 
environment, i.e. a set of relevant elements external to the RWS, through the exchange of  
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properties.  The term RWS is used to differentiate between the “system represented” and the 
“modeling system” used for the analysis. 
 
Recommended Practices:  Guidelines developed by professional societies, best practices 
documented for specific simulation codes, and NASA handbooks and guidebooks. 
 
Referent:  Data, information, knowledge, or theory against which simulation results can be 
compared (adapted from ASME V&V 10, Guide for Verification and Validation in Computational 
Solid Mechanics).  Note:  A referent may be the RWS to which the analysis is directed, a similar 
or analogous system (whereby the closeness of the referent to the RWS becomes pertinent), or a 
higher-fidelity model. 
 
Regression Testing:  Selective checking of the quality, performance, or reliability of an M&S 
system or component to verify that modifications have not caused unintended effects and that the 
M&S still complies with its requirements (adapted from ISO/IEC/IEEE 24765:2010 Systems and 
software engineering--Vocabulary).  Note:  This term is in no way related to statistical regression 
analysis.  
 
Responsible Party:  The group or individual identified as accountable for complying with 
requirements in this NASA Technical Standard.  Note: different parties may be identified for the 
various requirements. 
 
Results Robustness:  The characteristic whereby the behavior of (result from) an M&S does not 
change in a meaningful way to relatively slight variations in parameters.  The results from an 
M&S are robust if they are relatively stable (do not change in a meaningful way) with respect to 
changes in the parameters or input variables of the M&S.  Key sensitivities are parameters and 
variables shown to produce large changes in results with relatively small perturbations to input. 
 
Risk:  The combination of the probability a program or project will experience an undesired event; 
and the consequences, impact, or severity of the undesired event if it were to occur.  The 
probability and consequences may have associated uncertainties (adapted from NPR 7120.5). 
 
Scenario:  The description or definition of the relevant system and environmental assumptions, 
conditions, and/or parameters used to drive the course of events during the run of a simulation 
model.  It may include, but is not limited to, the set of initial conditions, a set of assumptions, the 
values of relevant parameters (including system and environmental conditions, locations and 
quantities of objects, entities, or resources), or a sequence of actions, which may be specified in 
the model itself.  Note:  Running the model with the given scenario is the simulation. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis:  The study of how variation in the output of an M&S can be apportioned to 
different sources of variation in the model input and parameters.  Note: The results robustness of 
an M&S-based analysis is obtained via sensitivity analysis (adapted from Saltelli, 2005). 
 
Simulation:  The imitation of the behavioral characteristics of a system, entity, phenomenon, or 
process.  
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Stimulation:  The description of a type of simulation whereby artificially generated signals are 
provided to real equipment in order to trigger it to produce the result required for verification of a 
RWS, training, maintenance, or for research and development. 
 
Stochastic:  Involving or containing a random variable or variables.  Pertaining to chance or 
probability. (http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Stochastic.html) 
 
Subject Matter Expert:  An individual having education, training, or experience in a particular 
technical or operational discipline, system, or process and who participates in an aspect of M&S 
requiring their expertise. 
 
Tailoring:  The process used to adjust or modify a prescribed requirement to better meet the needs 
of a specific program/project task or activity. 
 
Uncertainty:  (a) The estimated amount or percentage by which an observed or calculated value 
may differ from the true value;  (b) A broad and general term used to describe an imperfect state of 
knowledge or a variability resulting from a variety of factors, including, but not limited to, lack of 
knowledge, applicability of information, physical variation, randomness or stochastic behavior, 
indeterminacy, judgment, and approximation (adapted from NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety  
Program Requirements);  (c) Non-negative parameter characterizing the dispersion of  values 
attributed to a measured quantity.  
 
Uncertainty Characterization:  The process of identifying all relevant sources of uncertainties, 
characterizing them in all models, experiments, and comparisons of M&S results and experiments, 
and of either qualifying or quantifying uncertainties in all relevant inputs and outputs of the 
simulation or experiment. 
 
Unit Testing:  Any type of software testing conducted on the smallest meaningful, testable 
fragments of code to ensure the code behaves exactly as intended under various conditions.  For 
procedural programming languages, such code fragments are generally functions or subroutines.   
 
Use Assessment:  The process of determining if an M&S is accepted for a Proposed Use. 
 
Validation:  The process of determining the degree to which a model or a simulation is an accurate 
representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the M&S. 
 
Verification:  The process of determining the extent to which an M&S is compliant with its 
requirements and specifications as detailed in its conceptual models, mathematical models, or 
other constructs. 
 
Voluntary Consensus Standards (VCS):  Standards developed or adopted by VCS bodies, both 
domestic and international, that include provisions requiring that owners of relevant intellectual 
property have agreed to make that intellectual property available on a non-discriminatory, royalty-
free, or reasonable royalty basis to all interested parties. (Source: OMB Circular No. A-119.) 
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Waiver:  A documented authorization intentionally releasing a program or project from meeting a 
requirement (NPR 7120.5D). Deviations and exceptions are considered special cases of waivers. 
 
4. REQUIREMENTS 
 
This NASA Technical Standard establishes a minimum set of requirements and recommendations for 
M&S influencing or supporting decisions, particularly critical decisions. 
 
Decisions based entirely or partially on M&S are usually made within the context of a program 
or project.  The risk assumed by the program or project is often incorrectly estimated due to a 
number of factors that may occur throughout the development and use of an M&S, not the least 
of which is an inadequate assessment of uncertainties.  This NASA Technical Standard 
establishes practices to help reduce, assess, and communicate risk by making the factors leading 
to M&S credibility more apparent.  As such, this NASA Technical Standard contains a number of 
assessments that occur during the life cycle of an M&S.  This NASA Technical Standard provides 
a general M&S life cycle process, which parallels the NASA program/project management life 
cycle, as a basis for understanding the application of the requirements and recommendations it 
contains (see Appendix F – M&S Life Cycle).  These requirements and recommendations 
emphasize documentation and control of M&S processes and products to enforce transparency, 
repeatability, and traceability and also encourages the appropriate training and experience base 
for key M&S personnel. 
 
The requirements and recommendations in this NASA Technical Standard are generic in nature 
because of their broad applicability to all types of M&S.  Implementation details should be 
addressed in discipline-specific recommended practices, program/project/program management 
plans, etc.  Specific requirements applicable to M&S implemented in software are found in the NASA 
Software Engineering Requirements (NPR 7150.2). 
 
The following organizational structure is employed in this NASA Technical Standard: 
 
4.1  M&S Programmatics, including:  
 
• Planning across the M&S Cycle. 
• Identification and Use of Recommended Practices. 
• Training. 
 
4.2  M&S Development, including: 
 
• Verification. 
• Validation. 
• Uncertainty Characterization. 
4.3   M&S Use (Operations), including: 
• Uncertainty Characterization. 
• Sensitivity Analyses. 
NASA-STD-7009A 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE—DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED 
17 of 72 
• Assessing the Credibility of M&S Results. 
• Reporting Results to Decision Makers. 
 
In many instances, the modeling, simulation, and analysis activities are interwoven, particularly 
during the development, verification, and validation phases, but also may occur during the use (or 
operation) of an M&S.  This NASA Technical Standard is intended to be inclusive of all these 
possibilities. 
 
Program and project management have the responsibility to identify and document the parties 
responsible for complying with the requirements in this NASA Technical Standard.  The actual 
person identified to fulfill the role of the “responsible party” in specific requirements will likely vary 
depending upon the context of the requirement.  For example, the responsible party might be the 
lead, or another supporting person associated with the model development, operation, analysis, 
and/or reporting of results to decision makers.  Additionally, program and project management in 
collaboration with the Technical Authority have the responsibility to identify and document the 
extent and level of formality of processes (including any assessments) and documentation needed to 
meet the requirements in this NASA Technical Standard.  Furthermore, the Technical Authority has 
the particular responsibility to assure appropriate outcomes of [M&S 8], [M&S 23], and [M&S 31]. 
 
The documentation requirements do not imply that either the activity in question is required or that a 
new document for the model, simulation, or analysis is needed.  The intent is, however, to document 
what about the activity was either accomplished, or not accomplished.  Also, if some evidence or 
artifact of the relevant activity is available, then a reference to that evidence (e.g., a journal article, 
a technical report, an M&S development/test document or computer file, an M&S user/operator 
guide, or a program/project document) may suffice, provided that all the required details are 
contained therein and that specific locations of the required information is given. 
 
The responsibility party is to provide a rationale why any requirement (or recommendation, if 
imposed by tailoring or direction) is not met. 
4.1  M&S Programmatics 
 
The overarching topics of determining M&S criticality, defining basic objectives, requirements, and 
recommendations for M&S development and use, and understanding the results from any technical 
reviews performed related to the M&S are considered programmatic activities.  One key task when 
moving toward the creation of a new M&S is defining its intended use, that is, the expected purpose 
and application of an M&S.  This provides the initial basis of development and feeds into the 
concepts of “accepted use” at the end of development (section 4.2) and “proposed use” at the 
beginning of M&S use (section 4.3).  
 
Program and project management in collaboration with the Technical Authority have the 
responsibility to identify and document the critical decisions to be addressed with M&S and to 
determine which M&S are in scope, based upon the criticality of the situation addressed by the 
proposed use of the M&S.  Appendix D describes a representative M&S criticality assessment matrix 
for this purpose. 
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4.1.1  General M&S Programmatics 
 
The responsible party performs the following: 
a. [M&S 6] Shall perform and document the criticality assessment for the M&S. 
 
[Rationale:  The criticality assessment ensures communication of the amount of influence an M&S 
has on a particular situation relative to the consequences of that situation.] 
Appendix D describes a representative method for assessing criticality.  The method used, either 
Appendix D as is or modified, or another method, should be documented. 
 
b. [M&S 7] Shall identify and document if the M&S is in scope of this NASA Technical 
Standard. 
 
[Rationale:  Identifying that an M&S is in scope of this standard (including any tailoring) 
ensures clarity to M&S developers, users, and analysts as to what they are required to 
accomplish in their development or use of the M&S.] 
 
All M&S used to support critical decisions, as determined by the outcome of compliance with 
[M&S 6], are in scope of this NASA Technical Standard.  Beyond that, at the discretion of 
program/project management and the Technical Authority, any other M&S may be deemed in 
scope of this NASA Technical Standard. 
 
c. [M&S 8] Shall define the objectives and requirements for M&S products including 
the following: 
(1) The acceptance criteria for M&S products, including any endorsement for the 
M&S. 
 
(2) Intended use. 
 
The intended uses may be updated throughout the model development. 
 
(3) Metrics (programmatic and technical). 
(4) Verification, validation, and uncertainty characterization (see [M&S 15-16], 
[M&S 17-18], [M&S 19-21]). 
 
(5) Reporting of M&S information for critical decisions (see [M&S 32-39]). 
 
(6) Configuration management (CM) (artifacts, timeframe, processes) of M&S. 
 
[Rationale:  Defining objectives and requirements for M&S products informs developers and 
users about what is required of the specific M&S during development and use for the items 
important to M&S listed and particular to the requirements and practices of a program, project, 
organization, or office.] 
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d. [M&S 9] Shall document any technical reviews accomplished in regard to the 
development, management (control), and use of the M&S. 
[Rationale:  Documenting any technical review shows how, and what aspects of, M&S 
development or use were reviewed and the outcome of the reviews, as support for acceptance of 
the M&S and the results from its use.] 
 
Refer to NASA-HDBK-7009, NASA Handbook for Models and Simulations: An Implementation 
Guide for NASA-STD-7009, for more on this topic. 
 
4.1.2  General M&S Programmatic Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for general M&S practices are that responsible parties: 
 
a. Should develop a plan (including identifying the responsible organization(s)) for the 
acquisition, development, operation, maintenance, or retirement of the M&S. 
 
b. Should document M&S waiver processes. 
 
c. Should document the extent to which an M&S effort exhibits the characteristics of 
work product management, process definition, process measurement, process control, process 
change, and continuous improvement, including CM and M&S support and maintenance. 
4.1.3 M&S Best Practices Recommendations 
 
This NASA Technical Standard addresses general issues with respect to the use of M&S and 
does not discuss implementation details specific to individual programs, projects, disciplines, or 
processes.  The implementation details are addressed in relevant recommended practices (e.g., 
guidelines developed by professional societies, such as AIAA G-077, Guide for the Verification 
and Validation of Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulations, and ASME V&V 10, Guide for 
Verification and Validation in Computational Solid Mechanics, other best practices documented 
for specific simulation codes, and NASA handbooks and guidebooks.   
 
This section lists the recommendations for the identification of recommended practices. 
 
Recommendations for the identification of recommended practices are that responsible parties: 
a. Should identify and document any recommended practices that apply to M&S for the 
program/project. 
 
b. At a minimum, recommended practices for the following should be considered: 
(1) Data and M&S input verification, validation, and pedigree. 
(2) An auditing method of tracking adherence to recommended practices. 
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(3) Verification and validation processes for the M&S. 
(4) Uncertainty characterization methods for the M&S. 
 
(5) Sensitivity analysis methods for the M&S. 
(6)  Understanding of the disciplines incorporated in the M&S. 
 
(7) Analyzing and interpreting the M&S results, including documentation of inference 
guidelines and statistical processes used. 
 
(8) Recognizing and capturing the need for any changes or improvements in the 
M&S. 
(9) Reporting procedures for results. 
 
(10)Best practices for user interface design to constrain the operation of the M&S to 
within its limits of operations. 
4.1.4 M&S Training Recommendations 
 
Training refers to providing instruction on the proper development and use of M&S so an 
individual can develop, operate, or analyze the relevant M&S. 
 
Recommendations for training are that responsible parties: 
 
a. Should determine the depth of required training or equivalent experience (i.e., 
qualifications) for developers, operators, and analysts. 
 
b. Should document the following: 
 
(1) Training topics required for developers, operators, and analysts of M&S, which 
should include the following: 
 
A. The limits of operation for M&S, with implications and rationale. 
B. CM requirements. 
C. Documentation requirements and recommendations as specified in this NASA 
Technical Standard. 
D. How to recognize unrealistic results from simulations. 
E. Feedback processes to improve M&S processes and results, including 
providing feedback for results that are not credible, are unrealistic, or defy 
explanation. 
F. Sensitivity analysis. 
G. Uncertainty characterization. 
H. Verification and validation. 
I. How to report simulation results to decision makers. 
J. Statistics and probability. 
NASA-STD-7009A 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE—DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED 
21 of 72 
K. Discipline-specific recommended practices.  Other applicable Agency policy, 
procedural requirements, and standards. 
 
L. Basic modeling structures, mathematics, assumptions, and abstractions. 
 
(2) Process and criteria for verifying that training requirements are met. 
 
4.2  M&S Development 
 
The M&S development processes vary depending on the intended use and may be referred to as 
modeling activities.  This phase in the life cycle (see Appendix F) of an M&S begins by specifying 
the intended use of the model and by establishing an understanding of the existing or envisioned 
system to be modeled.  This is followed by developing the concept for the model (including 
conceptual, mathematical, or computational diagrams or models), continues with choosing 
application methods and platforms for implementing and testing (both verifying and validating) the 
model, and ends with releasing the model for use.  The permissible uses for the M&S are determined 
during development with an understanding of the abstractions taken in development, the 
assumptions for model use, the constraints of implementation methods used, and the limits of 
operation based on the completeness and success of both verification and validation. 
 
4.2.1  General M&S Development  
 
For model and simulation development, the responsible party performs the following: 
 
a. [M&S 10] Shall document the relevant characteristics, including data, about the RWS 
used to develop the model, including its pedigree (see Data Pedigree in Appendix E). 
 
[Rationale:  Documenting the relevant characteristics of the RWS provides the basis for M&S 
design, conceptual validation, development, and use.] 
 
RWS can be interpreted as narrowly or broadly as necessary, that is, from a single specific 
system to a whole class of systems, depending on the intended use of the M&S. 
 
b. [M&S 11] Shall document the assumptions and abstractions underlying the M&S, 
including their rationales. 
 
[Rationale:  Documenting assumptions and abstractions clarifies areas where the M&S differs 
from the RWS or where limits of implementation mechanisms may cause the M&S’s response to 
differ from that of the RWS.  This also provides an understanding needed for V&V, the 
specification of permissible uses, and the acceptance of proposed uses of the M&S.  Failure to 
clearly identify, understand and communicate assumptions and abstractions introduces risks 
throughout development and use of the M&S.] 
 
c. [M&S 12] Shall document the basic structure and mathematics of the model (e.g., 
equations solved, behaviors modeled, and conceptual models). 
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[Rationale:  Verification cannot be accomplished without an understanding of the basic 
structure and mathematics of the M&S.] 
 
For Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS), Government-Off-The-Shelf (GOTS), Modified-Off-The-
Shelf (MOTS), and legacy M&S, some of the documentation required in [M&S 11-12] and  may 
be available in published user guides; a reference to the user guides will suffice for this part of 
the documentation. 
d. [M&S 13] Shall document the limits of operation (e.g., boundary conditions) of 
models. 
[Rationale:  Documenting the limits of operation of an M&S provides specific parameter or 
variable ranges (operating conditions) where the M&S use is known to produce acceptable 
results as determined by M&S design and V&V.] 
 
e.  [M&S 14] Shall document the permissible uses of the M&S. 
 
[Rationale:  Documenting the permissible uses of an M&S at the end of M&S development 
aggregates the latest available information about the intended uses, limiting assumptions & 
abstractions, and V&V’d limits of M&S use.  The permissible uses are the basis for performing 
the use assessment of [M&S 23].] 
 
When a model’s development is completed, the permissible uses are determined by the intended 
use [M&S 8(2)]; the model’s assumptions and abstractions [M&S 11]; the limits of operation 
[M&S 13]; the domain of verification [M&S 16]; and the domain of validation [M&S 18].  
Furthermore, the permissible uses are the criteria by which the proposed use is assessed [M&S 
22]. 
 
4.2.2 General M&S Development Recommendations 
 
a. Should document data sets and any supporting software used in model development. 
 
b.  Should document units and vector coordinate frames (where applicable) for all 
input/output variables in the M&S. 
 
c.  Should document any methods of uncertainty characterization and the uncertainty in 
any data used to develop the model or incorporated into the model. 
 
d.  M&S should be designed and constructed so that, in the event of a failure, messages 
detailing the failure mode and point of failure are provided. 
 
This feature helps to prevent the inappropriate use of potentially misleading results. 
 
e.  Should document guidance on proper use of the M&S. 
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Guidance on proper use of a model includes descriptions of appropriate practices for set-up, 
execution, interfaces with other models when the model is used as part of either a linked or 
coupled model, and analysis of results. 
 
f.  Should document any parameter calibrations and the domain of calibration. 
 
g.  Should document updates of the model (e.g., solution adjustment, change of 
parameters, calibration, and test cases) and assign unique version identifier, description, and the 
justification for the updates. 
h.  CM records should contain test cases that span the limits of operation for the M&S 
defined by the program or project.   
 
“Test cases” are defined as benchmark input/output sets used to verify proper execution of the 
M&S. 
 
i.  Should document obsolescence criteria and obsolescence date of the model. 
 
Obsolescence refers to situations where changes to the real system invalidate the model. 
 
j.  Should provide a feedback mechanism for users to report unusual results to model 
developers or maintainers. 
 
k.  Should maintain (conceptual, mathematical, and computational) models and 
associated documentation in a controlled CM system. 
l.  Should maintain the data sets and supporting software referenced in Rec. “a” of this 
section and the associated documentation in a controlled CM system. 
 
m.  Should document any unique computational requirements (e.g., support software, 
main memory, disk capacities, processor, and compilation options). 
 
n.  Developers should convey serious concerns about M&S to project managers (and 
decision makers, if appropriate) as soon as they are known. 
 
4.2.3 M&S Verification 
 
The process of testing a model takes two distinct forms:  verification and validation.  While both 
these activities test the model, they do so for different reasons.  Verification is testing with 
respect to model design (specification).  While verification is usually meant to occur prior to 
validation, that precedence is not necessarily required and the two often occur in a cyclical or 
mixed manner depending on many factors in the overall model development process, and the 
success or failure in the testing process.  These two aspects of model testing are separately 
discussed because their purposes are different and should never be confounded. 
For verification, the responsible party performs the following: 
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a. [M&S 15] Shall verify all models. 
 
[Rationale:  Verifying the model ensures it is implemented in accordance with its design.] 
 
b. [M&S 16] Shall document the domain of verification of all models. 
 
[Rationale:  Documenting the domain of verification for the model provides operational 
criterion for which it is known to produce results within the capabilities for which it was 
constructed.] 
 
See Appendix E for more on this topic. 
 
4.2.4   M&S Verification Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for verification of M&S are that the responsible party: 
 
a. Should document any verification techniques used. 
 
NASA-HDBK-7009 has further information regarding specific verification techniques. 
 
b. Should document any numerical error estimates (e.g., numerical approximations, 
insufficient discretization, insufficient iterative convergence, finite-precision arithmetic) for the 
results of the computational model. 
 
c. Should document the verification status of (conceptual, mathematical, and 
computational) models. 
 
d. Should document any aspects of M&S that have not been verified. 
 
4.2.5 M&S Validation 
 
Testing a model with respect to the system the model is representing (i.e., the referent) is called 
validation.  (See discussion of verification in section 4.2.3.) 
 
For validation, the responsible party performs the following: 
 
a. [M&S 17] Shall validate all models. 
 
[Rationale:  Validating the model ensures it produces results acceptably similar to the RWS it 
represents.] 
 
b. [M&S 18] Shall document the domain of validation of all models. 
 
[Rationale:  Documenting the domain of validation for the model provides operational criterion 
for which it is known to produce results acceptably similar to the RWS it represents.] 
 
NASA-STD-7009A 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE—DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED 
25 of 72 
See Appendix E for more on this topic. 
 
4.2.6 M&S Validation Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for validation of M&S are that the responsible party: 
 
a. Should document any techniques used to validate the M&S for its intended use, 
including the experimental design and analysis.  NASA-HDBK-7009 has further information 
regarding specific validation techniques.  Should document any validation metrics and referents, 
and data sets used for model validation. 
b. Should document any studies conducted and results of model validation. 
 
c. Should document any aspects of M&S that have not been validated. 
 
4.2.7 Uncertainty Characterization in M&S Development 
 
No M&S is a perfect replica or imitator of the RWS for which the model is used to study.  
Characterizing the uncertainty in M&S results is, therefore, at least one way to qualify those 
results.  Factors influencing that uncertainty may occur in any part of the M&S life cycle, from 
the initial understanding of the RWS and the earliest conceptualization of the model through all 
aspects of model development, testing, and use.  When little actual information is available, this 
characterization may itself be qualitative, or may be quantified if data are or become available.  
The requirements and recommendations in this section are related to the handling and 
incorporation of uncertainties during M&S development.  
 
For uncertainty characterization, the responsible party performs the following: 
 
a. [M&S 19] Shall document any processes and rationale for characterizing uncertainty 
in the referent data. 
[Rationale:  Documenting how and why referent data uncertainty is analyzed ensures a rational 
basis for comparison with M&S results uncertainty (i.e., referent data uncertainty is not simply 
notional).  Referent data uncertainty is a partial basis for M&S validation [M&S 17-18].] 
 
b. [M&S 20] Shall explain and document any mechanisms or constructs related to the 
incorporation or propagation of uncertainty in the model. 
 
[Rationale:  Explaining and documenting how M&S uncertainty is incorporated in, and 
propagated through, an M&S ensures rational consideration was given to the effects of 
uncertainty during M&S development.] 
 
c. [M&S 21] Shall document any uncertainties (qualitatively described or quantitative) 
incorporated into the M&S. 
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[Rationale:  Documenting the uncertainties in an M&S ensures an understanding of the type and 
magnitude of uncertainties that propagate through an M&S and affect the results.] 
 
4.2.8  Uncertainty Characterization in M&S Development Recommendation 
 
a. The responsible party should document any significant physical processes, effects, 
scenarios, or environments not considered in the uncertainty characterization analysis. 
 
4.3  M&S Use (Operations) 
 
The use (or operation) of an M&S and the processing of the results from the use are simulation 
and analysis activities.  This phase in the life cycle (see Appendix F) of an M&S begins with a 
specific use being proposed and the assessment of the proposed use against the M&S’s 
permissible uses.  Once the use is accepted as appropriate for the M&S, the process of M&S 
setup and explicit scenario definition (e.g., design of experiments) begins, followed by the actual 
use (e.g., running) of the M&S, reviewing and analyzing the output results, and developing 
conclusions and recommendations for the RWS or situation under study. 
 
4.3.1   M&S Use Requirements   
 
For M&S use, the responsible party performs the following: 
 
a. [M&S 22] Shall document the proposed use(s) of the M&S. 
[Rationale:  Documenting the proposed use of an M&S ensures a clear communication of how 
the M&S is to be used, which is the subject of the use assessment required in [M&S 23].] 
 
b. [M&S 23] Shall perform and document an assessment of the appropriateness of the 
M&S relative to its proposed use.  
 
[Rationale:  The use assessment compares the proposed uses against the permissible uses to 
determine if the M&S is appropriate and if the use is within or outside the known acceptable 
uses of the M&S.] 
 
Determining the appropriateness of an M&S for a proposed use, referred to as a use assessment, 
is obtained by comparing the proposed use [M&S 22] to the permissible use [M&S 14].  The 
result of the use assessment is that either the M&S is or is not accepted for the proposed use. 
 
c. [M&S 24] Shall document data used as input to the M&S, including its pedigree (see 
Input Pedigree in Appendix E). 
 
Rationale:  Documented input data, including its pedigree, ensures an understanding of 
scenarios or experiments run with an M&S.  These, coupled with associated M&S results, 
provide a documented basis for conclusions drawn from the M&S use.] 
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d. [M&S 25] Shall document the rationale for the setup and execution of the simulation 
and analysis. 
[Rationale:  Documented rationale for M&S setup and execution ensures evidence is available 
for consideration and adjustment as needed.] 
Setup and execution rationale includes any assumptions made when using the M&S. 
 
e. [M&S 26] Shall do either of the following: 
 
(1) Ensure that simulations and analyses are conducted within the limits of operation 
of the models, or 
 
(2) Placard the simulation and analysis results with a warning that the simulation may 
have been conducted outside the limits of operation and include the type of limit 
that may have been exceeded, the extent that the limit might have been exceeded, 
and an assessment of the consequences of this action on the M&S results. 
[Rationale:  Placarding M&S results if used outside established permissible uses provides a 
warning to the consumers of that information.] 
 
f. [M&S 27] Shall document and explain any observed warning and error messages 
resulting from the execution of the computational M&S. 
 
[Rationale:  Unexplained warning or error messages are a cause for concern (increase risk) in 
accepting the results of an M&S use.] 
 
4.3.2   M&S Use Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for M&S Use are that responsible parties: 
 
a. Should document the relevant characteristics of the system that is the subject of the 
M&S-based analysis. 
 
b.  Should document which computational models were used (including revision 
numbers) in the simulation/analysis. 
 
c.  Should document any parameter calibrations and the domain of calibration. 
 
d.  Should document data sets and any supporting software used in input preparation. 
 
e.  Should document the processes for conducting simulations and analyses for 
generating results reported to decision makers. 
 
f.  Should document the versions of M&S results. 
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g.  Should document any use history of M&S, in the same or similar applications, which 
are relevant for establishing the credibility of the current M&S application (see Appendix 
E.4.3.1, M&S History Factor). 
 
h.  Should document and explain all failure modes, points of failure, and messages 
indicating such failures.   
 
4.3.3 Uncertainty Characterization in M&S Use 
 
As mentioned in section 4.2 (M&S Development), the characterization of uncertainty in M&S 
results may be influenced in any part of the M&S life cycle, including its use and the post-
processing of results.  The requirements and recommendations in this section are related to the 
incorporation, handling, and documentation of uncertainties during M&S use (operations). 
For uncertainty characterization in M&S use, the responsible party performs the following: 
 
a. [M&S 28] Shall document any processes and rationale for characterizing uncertainty 
in: 
 
(1) The input to an M&S. 
 
(2) The results from an M&S. 
 
(3) The quantities derived from M&S results. 
 
[Rationale:  Documenting how and why M&S uncertainties are input to, and handled in the 
results of, an M&S ensures a rational basis for inclusion and analysis when an M&S is used 
(i.e., input and results uncertainty is not simply notional).] 
 
b. [M&S 29] Shall document any uncertainties (qualitatively described or quantitative) 
in: 
 
(1) The input to an M&S. 
 
(2) The results from an M&S.   
 
This includes any MUFs incorporated into the M&S as well as any Factors of 
Safety (FS) that are intended to cover uncertainties in the model or simulation. 
The uncertainties those factors are intended to address should also be 
documented. 
 
(3) The quantities derived from M&S results. 
 
[Rationale:  Documenting the uncertainties in the input to and results from an M&S ensures an 
understanding of the type and magnitude of uncertainties that propagate through an M&S and 
show in the results.] 
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4.3.4 M&S Uncertainty Characterization in M&S Use Recommendation 
 
a.  Responsible parties should document any significant physical processes, effects, 
scenarios, or environments not considered in the uncertainty characterization analysis.   
4.3.5 M&S Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Sensitivity analysis is the study of an M&S’s response to variations in input parameters to 
determine which parameters are key drivers to the M&S’s results.  If the response is negligible, 
then the M&S (at least in the experimental domain), and by inference the RWS (as validated), 
are considered insensitive to that parameter.  Understanding the sensitivity to input parameters 
is key to determining the robustness of the M&S (see Results Robustness factor in Appendix E).  
On the other hand, if the response is not negligible, particularly to minor variations in the input 
parameters, the M&S is considered sensitive and that parameter is a key driver to the model 
results. 
 
Assessing the similarity of M&S sensitivity with that of the RWS is one of the tasks of M&S 
validation with the goal that M&S and RWS sensitivities are correlated.  
 
[M&S 30] The responsible party shall document the extent and results of any sensitivity analyses 
performed with the M&S.  
 
[Rationale:  Documenting the extent of sensitivity analyses ensures an understanding of how 
well the sensitivities were investigated and provides an understanding of the stability of M&S 
results to input (scenario) perturbations.] 
 
4.3.6 M&S Results Credibility Assessment  
 
Having an established process for assessing the credibility of M&S results helps to ensure a 
clearer and more complete communication of the important aspects of an M&S beyond just the 
results.  The assessment of credibility discussed in Appendix E does not purport to determine 
credibility directly, but merely to assess key factors that contribute to a decision-maker’s 
credibility assessment.  The assessment of these factors is focused on the results produced by the 
M&S; however, the completeness and rigor of all the activities throughout the life cycle of the 
M&S contribute to it.  This is why there are both developmental and operational factors for 
credibility.  The decision makers can then make their own credibility assessment based upon this 
information in the context of the decision at hand. 
 
This NASA Technical Standard itself levies no requirements with respect to what levels to 
achieve (the sufficiency threshold levels), merely that the levels be determined and reported. 
[M&S 31] The responsible party shall assess the credibility of M&S results for each of the 
factors described in Appendix E. 
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[Rationale:  The assessment of each credibility factor ensures a discussion the achievements and 
shortcomings of the M&S use beyond just the results, and provides a rational basis for either 
acceptance or rejection of the M&S results.] 
 
4.3.7   M&S Results Credibility Assessment Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for credibility assessments in M&S use are that responsible parties: 
a. Should set credibility sufficiency threshold levels for each factor as described in 
Appendix E.5. 
 
b.  Should justify and document the credibility assessment for each of the factors 
referenced in [M&S 31]. 
 
c. Should gain additional insight into the credibility of M&S results by applying the 
process in Appendix E.5 to determine and report any gaps between the achieved scores and the 
program/project-defined threshold scores for each of the factors.   
 
4.3.8   M&S Results Reporting  
 
Because of the inexact nature of all M&S in replicating any given RWS, more information than 
just the results are needed to provide a decision maker with a more complete understanding of 
the situation.  This includes (1) the best estimate of the results, (2) a statement on the uncertainty 
in the results, (3) the assessment of the credibility of results (Appendix E), (4) any explicit 
caveats accompanying the results (e.g., the use of the M&S in violation of its assumptions or 
limits of operation), and (5) the risks associated with accepting the results of the M&S.  This 
allows the decision makers to make their own conclusions about the quality or credibility of the 
results based upon all of this information, in the context of the decision at hand. 
 
These requirements and recommendations provide for reporting a high-level synopsis of M&S outcomes 
relevant to the current use. 
 
For reporting M&S results to decision makers, the responsible party performs the following: 
 
a. [M&S 32] Shall include explicit warnings for any of the following occurrences, 
accompanied by at least a qualitative estimate of the impact of the occurrence: 
 
(1) Any unachieved acceptance criteria (as specified in [M&S 8] (1)). 
(2) Violation of any assumptions of any model (as specified in [M&S 11]). 
(3) Violation of the limits of operation (as specified in [M&S 13]). 
 
(4) Execution warning and error messages (see [M&S 27]). 
 
(5) Unfavorable outcomes from the proposed use assessments (described in [M&S 23]). 
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(6) Unfavorable outcomes from any setup/execution assessments (described in [M&S 25]). 
 
(7) Waivers to any of the requirements in this NASA Technical Standard. 
[Rationale:  Reporting warnings for negative aspects of M&S development or use helps to 
ensure the inappropriate acceptance of M&S results, if the results are negatively impacted.] 
 
In the absence of documentation for any of the requirements referenced in [M&S 32 (1)-(6)],  
a warning is to be provided. 
 
b. [M&S 33] Shall include an estimate of results uncertainty, as defined in [M&S 29 
(1)-(3)], in one of the following ways: 
 
(1) A quantitative estimate of the uncertainty in the M&S results, or 
 
(2) A qualitative description of the uncertainty in the M&S results, or  
 
(3)  A clear statement that no quantitative estimate or qualitative description of 
uncertainty is available. 
 
[Rationale:  Reporting an estimate of uncertainty, or lack thereof, for the M&S results ensures 
an understanding that the results are estimates (not exact) within assessed boundaries.  Results 
without an estimate of uncertainty may differ vastly from those shown.] 
For [M&S 33] , a complete quantitative uncertainty estimate would provide uncertainty intervals 
about the M&S results and confidence statements based on analysis, whereas a qualitative 
uncertainty estimate would be provided only in linguistic terms, e.g., small, medium, or large, 
rather than in numeric terms.  Qualitative uncertainty estimates would still require justification, 
for example, by the descriptive phrasing of a subject matter expert (SME) or by resort to analogy 
with the quantified sensitivity of similar problems.  
 
c. [M&S 34] Shall include a description of any processes used to obtain the estimate of 
uncertainty as defined in [M&S 28 (1)-(3)]. 
 
[Rationale:  Reporting the processes used to obtain the estimate of uncertainty ensures the 
communication of how the uncertainties in the results occurred (or accumulated).] 
 
d. [M&S 35] Shall include the assessment of credibility for the M&S results for each 
factor specified in [M&S 31]. 
 
[Rationale:  Reporting the credibility assessment ensures communication of how well those 
aspects (factors) of M&S development and use were accomplished, which can affect the 
acceptance of the M&S results.] 
 
e. [M&S 36] Shall include the findings from any technical reviews accomplished in 
regard to the development, management (control), and use of the M&S. 
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[Rationale:  Reporting findings from any technical reviews ensures the communication of 
supportive or unsupportive information related to what aspect of the M&S effort was reviewed.] 
 
Refer to NASA-HDBK-7009 for more on this topic. 
 
f.  [M&S 37] Shall include the qualifications of the developers of the M&S and the 
users, operators, and/or analysts involved in producing the results from the M&S, including, but 
not limited to, their relevant education, training, and experience. 
[Rationale:  Reporting the qualifications of the developers, users, operators, and/or analysts 
involved in producing the M&S, or results therefrom, ensures clarity in qualifications.  Specific 
topic areas that constitute qualification depends on the type and application of the M&S (the 
recommendations of sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 may be consulted).] 
 
g. [M&S 38] Shall show what aspects of modeling and simulation are documented, as 
shown in Appendix A. 
 
[Rationale:  Reporting what aspects of modeling and simulation are documented ensures clear 
evidence of what was actually accomplished in M&S development and use.] 
 
Appendix A lists all the requirements and Appendix B lists all the recommendations in a 
“compliance type” table with “if,” “how,” and “where” it is documented. 
h. [M&S 39] Shall include an assessment of and rationale for the risks associated with 
the use of the M&S-based analysis. 
 
[Rationale:  Reporting assessment of and rationale for the risks associated with the use of the 
M&S-based analysis ensures the open communication of possible issues with the M&S, or use 
thereof, and may inform program/project risk management processes.] 
 
These risks may be due to factors inherent to the M&S, or associated with the specific application or 
use of the M&S.  Compliance with the reporting requirements [M&S 32-38] yields information to 
inform applicable program/project risk management processes and procedures. 
 
4.3.9   M&S Results Reporting Recommendations 
 
Recommendations for reporting results from M&S use are that responsible parties: 
 
a. Should include concluding remarks stating whether the M&S results are credible 
enough for the actual use. 
 
b. Should identify how to access more detailed backup material, including high-level 
descriptions of the models used and key assumptions for limits of validity. 
 
c. Should place M&S results in the CM system. 
 
NASA-STD-7009A 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE—DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED 
33 of 72 
d. Should summarize deviations from established recommended practices. 
 
e. Should include dissenting technical opinions regarding the credibility of the results 
or any recommended actions. 
 
f. Should convey serious concerns about M&S or its use to project managers (and 
decision makers, if appropriate) as soon as they are known. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
REQUIREMENTS COMPLIANCE MATRIX 
 
A.1 Purpose 
 
This appendix provides a listing of requirements contained in this NASA Technical Standard for selection and verification of 
requirements by programs, projects, organizations, or offices. (Note: Enter “Yes” to describe the requirement’s applicability to the 
program or project; or enter “No” if the intent is to tailor, and enter how tailoring is to be applied in the “Rationale” column.) 
 
 
NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Requirement in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
1.2 Applicability [M&S 1] When conflicts exist between this NASA Technical Standard and voluntary consensus 
standards (VCS), this document shall take precedence, except in those cases where the VCS is 
invoked by applicable Government regulation. 
  
1.3 Tailoring [M&S 2] Tailoring of this NASA Technical Standard for application to a specific 
program/project/organization/office shall be formally documented as part of 
program/project/organization/office requirements and approved by the responsible Technical 
Authority in accordance with NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 
Requirements. 
  
2.1.1 Applicable 
Documents 
[M&S 3] The latest issuances of cited documents shall be used unless otherwise approved by the 
assigned Technical Authority. 
  
2.1.2 Applicable 
Documents 
[M&S 4] Non-use of specifically designated versions shall be approved by the responsible 
Technical Authority. 
  
2.4.2 Order of 
Precedence 
[M&S 5] Conflicts between this NASA Technical Standard and other requirements documents 
shall be resolved by the responsible Technical Authority. 
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NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Requirement in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
4.1.1a General M&S 
Programmatics  
[M&S 6] Shall perform and document the criticality assessment for the M&S.   
4.1.1b General M&S 
Programmatics  
[M&S 7] Shall identify and document if the M&S is in scope of this NASA Technical Standard.   
4.1.1c General M&S 
Programmatics  
[M&S 8] Shall define the objectives and requirements for M&S products including the following: 
(1) The acceptance criteria for M&S products, including any endorsement for the M&S. 
(2) Intended use. 
The intended uses may be updated throughout the model development. 
(3) Metrics (programmatic and technical). 
(4) Verification, validation, and uncertainty characterization (see [M&S 15-16], [M&S 17-
18], [M&S 19-21]). 
(5) Reporting of M&S information for critical decisions (see [M&S 32-39]). 
(6) Configuration management (CM) (artifacts, timeframe, processes) of M&S. 
  
4.1.1d General M&S 
Programmatics  
[M&S 9] Shall document any technical reviews accomplished in regard to the development, 
management (control), and use of the M&S. 
  
4.2.1a General M&S 
Development 
[M&S 10] Shall document the relevant characteristics, including data, about the RWS used to 
develop the model, including its pedigree (see Data Pedigree in Appendix E). 
  
4.2.1b General M&S 
Development 
[M&S 11] Shall document the assumptions and abstractions underlying the M&S, including their 
rationales. 
  
4.2.1c General M&S 
Development 
[M&S 12] Shall document the basic structure and mathematics of the model (e.g., equations 
solved, behaviors modeled, and conceptual models). 
  
4.2.1d General M&S 
Development 
[M&S 13] Shall document the limits of operation (e.g., boundary conditions) of models.   
4.2.1e General M&S 
Development 
[M&S 14] Shall document the permissible uses of the M&S.   
4.2.3a M&S Verification [M&S 15] Shall verify all models.   
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NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Requirement in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
4.2.3b M&S Verification [M&S 16] Shall document the domain of verification of all models.   
4.2.5a M&S Validation [M&S 17] Shall validate all models.   
4.2.5b M&S Validation [M&S 18] Shall document the domain of validation of all models.   
4.2.7a Uncertainty 
Characterization in 
M&S Development 
[M&S 19] Shall document any processes and rationale for characterizing uncertainty in the 
referent data. 
  
4.2.7b Uncertainty 
Characterization in 
M&S Development 
[M&S 20] Shall explain and document any mechanisms or constructs related to the incorporation 
or propagation of uncertainty in the model. 
  
4.2.7c Uncertainty 
Characterization in 
M&S Development 
[M&S 21] Shall document any uncertainties (qualitatively described or quantitative) incorporated 
into the M&S. 
  
4.3.1a M&S Use  
Requirements 
[M&S 22] Shall document the proposed use(s) of the M&S.   
4.3.1b M&S Use  
Requirements 
[M&S 23] Shall perform and document an assessment of the appropriateness of the M&S relative 
to its proposed use. 
  
4.3.1c M&S Use 
Requirements 
[M&S 24] Shall document data used as input to the M&S, including its pedigree (see Input 
Pedigree in Appendix E). 
  
4.3.1d M&S Use  
Requirements 
[M&S 25] Shall document the rationale for the setup and execution of the simulation and analysis.   
4.3.1e M&S Use 
Requirements 
[M&S 26] Shall do either of the following: 
(1) Ensure that simulations and analyses are conducted within the limits of operation of the 
models, or 
(2) Placard the simulation and analysis results with a warning that the simulation may have been 
conducted outside the limits of operation and include the type of limit that may have been 
exceeded, the extent that the limit might have been exceeded, and an assessment of the 
consequences of this action on the M&S results. 
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NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Requirement in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
4.3.1f M&S Use  
Requirements 
[M&S 27] Shall document and explain any observed warning and error messages resulting from 
the execution of the computational M&S. 
  
4.3.3a Uncertainty 
Characterization in 
M&S Use 
[M&S 28] Shall document any processes and rationale for characterizing uncertainty in: 
(1) The input to an M&S. 
(2) The results from an M&S. 
(3) The quantities derived from M&S results. 
  
4.3.3b Uncertainty 
Characterization in 
M&S Use 
[M&S 29] Shall document any uncertainties (qualitatively described or quantitative) in: 
(1) The input to an M&S. 
(2) The results from an M&S. 
 
This includes any MUFs incorporated into the M&S as well as any Factors of Safety (FS) that 
are intended to cover uncertainties in the model or simulation. The uncertainties those factors 
are intended to address should also be documented. 
(3) The quantities derived from M&S results. 
  
4.3.5 M&S Sensitivity 
Analysis 
[M&S 30] The responsible party shall document the extent and results of any sensitivity analyses 
performed with the M&S. 
  
4.3.6 M&S Results 
Credibility 
Assessment 
[M&S 31] The responsible party shall assess the credibility of M&S results for each of the factors 
described in Appendix E. 
  
4.3.8a M&S Results 
Reporting 
[M&S 32] Shall include explicit warnings for any of the following occurrences, accompanied by at 
least a qualitative estimate of the impact of the occurrence: 
(1) Any unachieved acceptance criteria (as specified in [M&S 8 (1)]). 
(2) Violation of any assumptions of any model (as specified in [M&S 11]). 
(3) Violation of the limits of operation (as specified in [M&S 13]). 
(4) Execution warning and error messages (see [M&S 27]). 
(5) Unfavorable outcomes from the proposed use assessments (described in [M&S 23]). 
(6) Unfavorable outcomes from any setup/execution assessments (described in [M&S 25]). 
(7) Waivers to any of the requirements in this NASA Technical Standard. 
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NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Requirement in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
4.3.8b M&S Results 
Reporting 
[M&S 33] Shall include an estimate of results uncertainty, as defined in [M&S 29 (1)-(3)], in one 
of the following ways: 
(1) A quantitative estimate of the uncertainty in the M&S results, or 
(2) A qualitative description of the uncertainty in the M&S results, or  
(3) A clear statement that no quantitative estimate or qualitative description of uncertainty is 
available. 
  
4.3.8c M&S Results 
Reporting 
[M&S 34] Shall include a description of any processes used to obtain the estimate of uncertainty as 
defined in [M&S 28 (1)-(3)]. 
  
4.3.8d M&S Results 
Reporting 
[M&S 35] Shall include the assessment of credibility for the M&S results for each factor specified 
in [M&S 31]. 
  
4.3.8e M&S Results 
Reporting 
[M&S 36] Shall include the findings from any technical reviews accomplished in regard to the 
development, management (control), and use of the M&S. 
  
4.3.8f M&S Results 
Reporting 
[M&S 37] Shall include the qualifications of the developers of the M&S and the users, operators, 
and/or analysts involved in producing the results from the M&S, including, but not limited to, their 
relevant education, training, and experience. 
  
4.3.8g M&S Results 
Reporting 
[M&S 38] Shall show what aspects of modeling and simulation are documented, as shown in 
Appendix A. 
  
4.3.8h M&S Results 
Reporting 
[M&S 39] Shall include an assessment of and rationale for the risks associated with the use of the 
M&S-based analysis. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS COMPLIANCE MATRIX 
 
B.1 Purpose 
 
This appendix provides a listing of recommendations contained in this NASA Technical Standard for selection and verification if 
designated by programs, projects, organizations, or offices. (Note: Enter “Yes” to describe the recommendation’s applicability to the 
program, projects, organizations, or offices; or enter “No” if the intent is to tailor, and enter how tailoring is to be applied in the 
“Rationale” column.) 
 
NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Recommendation in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
4.1.2a General M&S 
Programmatic 
Recommendations 
Should develop a plan (including identifying the responsible organization(s)) for the acquisition, 
development, operation, maintenance, or retirement of the M&S. 
  
4.1.2b General M&S 
Programmatic 
Recommendations 
Should document M&S waiver processes.   
4.1.2c General M&S 
Programmatic 
Recommendations 
Should document the extent to which an M&S effort exhibits the characteristics of work product 
management, process definition, process measurement, process control, process change, and 
continuous improvement, including CM and M&S support and maintenance. 
  
4.1.3a M&S  Best 
Practices 
Recommendations 
Should identify and document any recommended practices that apply to M&S for the 
program/project. 
  
4.1.3b M&S Best  
Practices 
At a minimum, recommended practices for the following should be considered:   
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NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Recommendation in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
Recommendations (1) Data and M&S input verification, validation, and pedigree. 
(2) An auditing method of tracking adherence to recommended practices. 
(3) Verification and validation processes for the M&S. 
(4) Uncertainty characterization methods for the M&S. 
(5) Sensitivity analysis methods for the M&S. 
(6)  Understanding of the disciplines incorporated in the M&S. 
(7) Analyzing and interpreting the M&S results, including documentation of inference 
guidelines and statistical processes used. 
(8) Recognizing and capturing the need for any changes or improvements in the M&S. 
(9) Reporting procedures for results. 
(10) Best practices for user interface design to constrain the operation of the M&S to within its 
limits of operations. 
4.1.4a M&S Training 
Recommendations 
Should determine the depth of required training or equivalent experience (i.e., qualifications) for 
developers, operators, and analysts. 
  
4.1.4b M&S Training 
Recommendations 
Should document the following: 
(1) Training topics required for developers, operators, and analysts of M&S, which should 
include the following: 
 
A. The limits of operation for M&S, with implications and rationale. 
B. CM requirements. 
C. Documentation requirements and recommendations as specified in this NASA Technical 
Standard. 
D. How to recognize unrealistic results from simulations. 
E. Feedback processes to improve M&S processes and results, including providing feedback 
for results that are not credible, are unrealistic, or defy explanation. 
F. Sensitivity analysis. 
G. Uncertainty characterization. 
H. Verification and validation. 
I. How to report simulation results to decision makers. 
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NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Recommendation in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
J. Statistics and probability. 
K. Discipline-specific recommended practices.  Other applicable Agency policy, procedural 
requirements, and standards. 
L. Basic modeling structures, mathematics, assumptions, and abstractions. 
 
(2) Process and criteria for verifying that training requirements are met. 
4.2.2a General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should document data sets and any supporting software used in model development.   
4.2.2b General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should document units and vector coordinate frames (where applicable) for all input/output 
variables in the M&S. 
  
4.2.2c General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should document any methods of uncertainty characterization and the uncertainty in any data used 
to develop the model or incorporated into the model. 
  
4.2.2d General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
M&S should be designed and constructed so that, in the event of a failure, messages detailing the 
failure mode and point of failure are provided. 
  
4.2.2e General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should document guidance on proper use of the M&S.   
4.2.2f General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should document any parameter calibrations and the domain of calibration.   
4.2.2g General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should document updates of the model (e.g., solution adjustment, change of parameters, 
calibration, and test cases) and assign unique version identifier, description, and the justification 
for the updates. 
  
4.2.2h General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
CM records should contain test cases that span the limits of operation for the M&S defined by the 
program or project.   
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NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Recommendation in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
4.2.2i General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should document obsolescence criteria and obsolescence date of the model.   
4.2.2j General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should provide a feedback mechanism for users to report unusual results to model developers or 
maintainers. 
  
4.2.2k General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should maintain (conceptual, mathematical, and computational) models and associated 
documentation in a controlled CM system. 
  
4.2.2l General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should maintain the data sets and supporting software referenced in Rec. “a” of this section and 
the associated documentation in a controlled CM system. 
  
4.2.2m General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Should document any unique computational requirements (e.g., support software, main memory, 
disk capacities, processor, and compilation options). 
  
4.2.2n General M&S 
Development 
Recommendations 
Developers should convey serious concerns about M&S to project managers (and decision makers, 
if appropriate) as soon as they are known. 
  
4.2.4a M&S Verification 
Recommendations 
Should document any verification techniques used.   
4.2.4b M&S Verification 
Recommendations 
Should document any numerical error estimates (e.g., numerical approximations, insufficient 
discretization, insufficient iterative convergence, finite-precision arithmetic) for the results of the 
computational model. 
  
4.2.4c M&S Verification 
Recommendations 
Should document the verification status of (conceptual, mathematical, and computational) models.   
4.2.4d M&S Verification 
Recommendations 
Should document any aspects of M&S that have not been verified.   
4.2.6a M&S Validation 
Recommendations 
Should document any techniques used to validate the M&S for its intended use, including the 
experimental design and analysis. 
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NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Recommendation in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
4.2.6b M&S Validation 
Recommendations 
Should document any validation metrics and referents, and data sets used for model validation.   
4.2.6c M&S Validation 
Recommendations 
Should document any studies conducted and results of model validation.   
4.2.6d M&S Validation 
Recommendations 
Should document any aspects of M&S that have not been validated.   
4.2.8a Uncertainty 
Characterization in 
M&S Development 
Recommendation 
The responsible party should document any significant physical processes, effects, scenarios, or 
environments not considered in the uncertainty characterization analysis. 
  
4.3.2a M&S Use  
Recommendations 
Should document the relevant characteristics of the system that is the subject of the M&S-based 
analysis. 
  
4.3.2b M&S Use  
Recommendations 
Should document which computational models were used (including revision numbers) in the 
simulation/analysis. 
  
4.3.2c M&S Use  
Recommendations 
Should document any parameter calibrations and the domain of calibration.   
4.3.2d M&S Use  
Recommendations 
Should document data sets and any supporting software used in input preparation.   
4.3.2e M&S Use  
Recommendations 
Should document the processes for conducting simulations and analyses for generating results 
reported to decision makers. 
  
4.3.2f M&S Use  
Recommendations 
Should document the versions of M&S results.   
4.3.2g M&S Use  
Recommendations 
Should document any use history of M&S, in the same or similar applications, which are relevant 
for establishing the credibility of the current M&S application (see Appendix E.4.3.1, M&S 
History Factor). 
  
4.3.2h M&S Use  
Recommendations 
Should document and explain all failure modes, points of failure, and messages indicating such 
failures.   
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NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Recommendation in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
4.3.4a M&S Uncertainty 
Characterization in 
M&S Use 
Recommendation 
Responsible parties should document any significant physical processes, effects, scenarios, or 
environments not considered in the uncertainty characterization analysis.   
  
4.3.7a M&S Results 
Credibility 
Assessment 
Recommendations 
Should set credibility sufficiency threshold levels for each factor as described in Appendix E.5.   
4.3.7b M&S Results 
Credibility 
Assessment 
Recommendations 
Should justify and document the credibility assessment for each of the factors referenced in [M&S 
31]. 
  
4.3.7c M&S Results 
Credibility 
Assessment 
Recommendations 
Should gain additional insight into the credibility of M&S results by applying the process in 
Appendix E.5 to determine and report any gaps between the achieved scores and the 
program/project-defined threshold scores for each of the factors.   
  
4.3.9a M&S Results 
Reporting 
Recommendations 
Should include concluding remarks stating whether the M&S results are credible enough for the 
actual use. 
  
4.3.9b M&S Results 
Reporting 
Recommendations 
Should identify how to access more detailed backup material, including high-level descriptions of 
the models used and key assumptions for limits of validity. 
  
4.3.9c M&S Results 
Reporting 
Recommendations 
Should place M&S results in the CM system.   
4.3.9d M&S Results 
Reporting 
Recommendations 
Should summarize deviations from established recommended practices.   
4.3.9e M&S Results 
Reporting 
Recommendations 
Should include dissenting technical opinions regarding the credibility of the results or any 
recommended actions. 
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NASA-STD-7009A 
Section Description Recommendation in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) 
If No, Enter 
Rationale 
4.3.9f M&S Results 
Reporting 
Recommendations 
Should convey serious concerns about M&S or its use to project managers (and decision makers, if 
appropriate) as soon as they are known. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
REFERENCES 
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The purpose of this appendix is to provide guidance in the reference documents that follow. 
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C.2.1 Government Documents 
 
 Department of Defense (DoD) 
 
DoD Instruction 
5000.61 
“DoD Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Verification, Validation, 
and Accreditation (VV&A)” (December 9, 2009). 
 
MIL-STD-3022 Documentation of Verification, Validation, and Accreditation 
(VV&A) for Models and Simulations (28 January 2008). 
 
Verification, 
Validation, and 
Accreditation (VV&A) 
Recommended 
Practices Guide (RPG) 
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Capability Maturity Model for Computational Modeling and 
Simulation. Sandia National Laboratories. 
 (https://cfwebprod.sandia.gov/cfdocs/CompResearch/docs/Oberka
mpf-Pilch-Trucano-SAND2007-5948.pdf). 
 
 SAE International 
 
 SAE/EIA 649B Configuration Management Standard 
 
 
C.2.3 Other Reference Documents  
 
Balci, O. (2004).  Quality Assessment, Verification, and Validation of Modeling and 
Simulation Applications.  Proceedings of the 2004 Winter Simulation Conference.  R.G. 
Ingalls; M.D. Rossetti; J.S. Smith; B.A. Peters, eds.  Dec. 5-8.   Piscataway, NJ: IEEE.  
pp. 122-129. 
 
Banks, J.,  ed.  (1998).  Handbook of Simulation.  New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Clemen, R.T.  (1996).  Making Hard Decisions; an Introduction to Decision Analysis, Second 
Edition.  Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
 
Cooke, R.M.  (1991).  Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science.  
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hale, J.P.; Hartway, B.L.; Thomas, D.A.  (2007).  A Common M&S Credibility Criteria-set 
Supports Multiple Problem Domains.  The 5th Joint Army-Navy-NASA-Air Force 
(JANNAF) Modeling and Simulation Subcommittee Meeting, CDJSC 49, May, CPIAC.  
Columbia, MD: Johns Hopkins University. 
 
Harmon, S.Y.; Youngblood, S.M.  (2005).  “A Proposed Model for Simulation Validation 
Process Maturity.” J. Defense Modeling & Simulation.  Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 179-190. 
Mehta, U.B.  (2007).  “Simulation Credibility Level.”  The 5th Joint Army-Navy-NASA-Air 
Force (JANNAF) Modeling and Simulation Subcommittee Meeting, CDJSC 49, May, 
CPIAC.  Columbia, MD: Johns Hopkins University. 
 
NASA-STD-7009A 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE—DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED 
49 of 72 
Saltelli, A.; Chan, K.; Scott, E.M., eds.  (2000).  Sensitivity Analysis.  Chichester, England: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Sargent, R. G. 1979.  Validation of simulation models.  In Proceedings of the 1979 Winter 
Simulation Conference, ed. H. J. Highland, M. F. Spiegel, and R. E. Shannon, 497-503. 
Piscataway, New Jersey:  IEEE. 
 
  
 
NASA-STD-7009A 
 
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE—DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED 
50 of 72 
APPENDIX D 
 
M&S CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT 
 
D.1 Purpose  
 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a method for communicating the criticality of the 
situation(s) or decision(s) to which the M&S results are applied. 
 
The determination of how rigorously an M&S effort should follow this NASA Technical 
Standard is dependent on many influences, with an understanding of the criticality of the 
decision(s) to which the M&S results are applied being paramount.  An M&S criticality 
assessment considers (1) the consequences to human safety or mission success criteria, and (2) 
the degree to which M&S results influence a decision.  This provides a proactive method to 
mitigate potential risks as early as possible in the M&S life cycle.  This appendix provides a 
sample M&S criticality assessment matrix to communicate this determination (figure 1, M&S 
Criticality Assessment Matrix (Sample)).  Programs, projects, stakeholders, or customers of 
M&S may adjust this matrix to their particular situation (e.g., consequence definitions, number 
of consequence or M&S influence levels) as needed. 
5: Controlling (G) (Y) (R) (R) (R)
4: Significant (G) (Y) (Y) (R) (R)
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Figure 1—M&S Criticality Assessment Matrix (Sample) 
 
From the perspective of situational criticality, the three possible cases for assessment are: 
 
• Those M&S that are assessed to fall within the red (R) boxes in figure 1 are clear 
candidates for fully following this NASA Technical Standard. 
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• The M&S that are assessed to fall within the yellow (Y) boxes may or may not be 
candidates for fully following this NASA Technical Standard at the discretion of 
program/project management in collaboration with the Technical Authority. 
• There is not a critical driving force for those falling within the green (G) boxes. 
 
However, any M&S effort within or outside the auspices of a program or project, even without a 
defined critical use, may choose to use this NASA Technical Standard as a guide for good 
practices in M&S development, use, and reporting. 
 
D.2 Decision Consequence 
 
Consequence classifications assess the impact of an M&S-influenced decision that may prove 
detrimental to the RWS.  The RWS, of course, may include any personnel, hardware (including 
software), equipment, or facilities acting with or within it.     
The number of Consequence levels is taken from various NASA sources, including the NASA 
Systems Engineering Handbook (NASA/SP-2007-6105), the NASA Risk Management 
Handbook (NASA/SP-2011-3422), and the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) 
procedure, Technical Assessment Initial Evaluation (NESC-PR-006).  The affected personnel, 
hardware, equipment, or facility should be broadly interpreted as operational (flight or ground) 
or non-operational (on-site or public).  The qualifying terms of few, many, and most are 
situationally dependent and should be determined by the affected program, project, or customer. 
 
The first four rows of table 1, Decision Consequences, indicate what specifically is impacted, 
and the subsequent rows indicate what aspect of the program or mission is impacted. 
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Table 1—Decision Consequences (Sample) 
  I:  Negligible II:  Minor III:  Moderate IV:  Significant V:  Catastrophic 
Personnel (All, 
Any) 
Inconsequential. Minor detriment 
(first aid). 
Minor injury or 
occupational 
illness. 
Severe injury or 
occupational 
illness. 
Permanent 
disability or death. 
Flight or Ground 
Hardware 
Inconsequential. Minor detriment 
(minor 
maintenance). 
Minor 
detriment 
(maintenance 
required). 
Major damage. Destructed. 
Flight or Ground 
Equipment 
Inconsequential. Minor detriment 
(minor 
maintenance). 
Minor 
detriment 
(maintenance 
required). 
Major damage. Destructed. 
Flight or Ground 
Facilities 
Inconsequential. Minor detriment 
(minor 
maintenance). 
Minor 
detriment 
(maintenance 
required). 
Major damage. Destructed. 
Operational 
Status 
No effect. At most a 
temporary effect. 
Temporarily 
off-line for 
repair. 
Permanently 
degraded until 
repaired. 
Non-operational. 
Capabilities 
(Performance) 
No effect; no  
degradation. 
At most a 
temporary effect; no 
more than 
inconsequential 
degradation. 
Temporarily 
unavailable 
until restored; 
some minor 
degradation. 
Significant or 
permanent 
degradation 
until repaired. 
Severely degraded 
to none. 
Schedules No effect. Minor impact to 
schedule with no 
effect on major 
mission 
(operations) 
milestones. 
Internal 
schedule slips 
with no effect 
on major 
mission 
(operations) 
milestones. 
Impacts to 
major mission 
(operations) 
milestones. 
Operational (e.g., 
mission) windows 
missed. 
Cost No effect. Minor cost impact 
but within nominal 
margins. 
Cost overruns 
beyond nominal 
margins, but not 
detrimental to 
project 
execution or 
completion. 
Cost overruns 
detrimental to 
program or 
project 
execution or 
full completion. 
Cost overruns 
cause major 
program or project 
reductions or 
cancellation. 
Mission Success 
Criteria 
All met. All met. A few not met. Many not met. Most to all not met. 
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D.3 M&S Influence 
 
Influence estimates the degree to which M&S results impact the (program/project) decision 
under consideration (table 2, M&S Influence).  This is predicated on the amount of other 
information available when making the impending decision.  (Engineering decisions include 
determination of whether design requirements have been verified.) 
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Table 2—M&S Influence (Sample) 
M&S Influence Real System in Real 
Environment 
 Similar System in 
Similar Environment 
 Other M&S 
5: Controlling No data are available 
for the real system in 
the real environment. 
& No data are available for 
a similar system in 
similar environment. 
& No other M&S or analysis data 
are available. 
4: Significant No data are available 
for the real system in 
the real environment. 
& Ample flight or test data 
for similar systems in 
similar environments 
are available. 
 No other M&S or analysis data 
are available. 
--- Or --- 
No data are available 
for the real system in 
the real environment. 
& No data are available for 
a similar system in 
similar environment. 
& Credible results from another 
M&S are available. 
3: Moderate Limited flight or test 
data for the real 
system in the real 
environment are 
available. 
& Ample flight or test data 
for similar systems in 
similar environments 
are available. 
 No other M&S or analysis data 
are available. 
--- Or --- 
No data are available 
for the real system in 
the real environment. 
 Ample flight or test data 
for similar systems in 
similar environments 
are available. 
& Credible results from another 
M&S are available. 
2: Minor Some flight or test 
data for the real 
system in the real 
environment are 
available. 
 Flight or test data for 
similar systems in 
similar environments 
may or may not be 
available. 
 No other M&S or analysis data 
are available. 
--- Or --- 
1: Negligible Ample flight or test 
data for the real 
system in the real 
environment are 
available. 
 Flight or test data for 
similar systems in 
similar environments 
may or may not be 
available. 
 No other M&S or analysis data 
are available. 
--- Or --- 
Some flight or test 
data for the real 
system in the real 
environment are 
available. 
 Flight or test data for 
similar systems in 
similar environments 
may or may not be 
available. 
& Credible results from another 
M&S are available. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
M&S CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT  
 
E.1 Purpose  
 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a method for assessing the credibility of M&S-based 
results.  
 
E.2 Introduction 
 
This appendix describes the process and factors for assessing the credibility of M&S-based 
results.  The factors are described in section E.3, along with an overall introduction to the 
defined credibility levels.  Section E.4 gives a detailed description of the credibility levels for 
each factor of the credibility assessment.  Section E.5 describes the concept of program/project-
defined sufficiency thresholds recommended in section 4.3 and how they may be used. 
 
E.3 Overview of Credibility Factors and Categories 
 
As mentioned in section 4.3, M&S Use (Operations), the credibility of M&S-based results is not 
something that can be assessed directly.  However, key factors of credibility may be assessed 
more directly.  All of the practices or attributes contained in the requirements and 
recommendations of this NASA Technical Standard lend themselves to improved credibility of 
M&S-based results, but the key factors contained in this assessment are considered a minimum 
set. 
 
The eight factors are Data Pedigree, Verification, Validation, Input Pedigree, Uncertainty 
Characterization, Results Robustness, M&S History, and M&S Process/Product Management.  
They are grouped into the three categories of M&S Development (Data Pedigree, Verification, 
Validation); M&S Use (Input Pedigree, Uncertainty Characterization, Results Robustness); 
Supporting Evidence (M&S History, M&S Process/Product Management), which may span all 
aspects of an M&S), as illustrated in figure 2, Credibility Assessment Structure. 
 
 
Figure 2—Credibility Assessment Structure 
 
These eight factors were selected from a long list of factors that potentially contribute to the credibility 
of M&S results because (a) they were individually judged to be the key factors in this list; (b) they are 
nearly orthogonal, i.e., largely independent, factors; and (c) they can be assessed objectively.  These 
factors are categorized according to the general phase of the M&S life cycle to which they pertain.  The 
M&S Development category captures those aspects of the M&S that pertain to the general purposes for 
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which it was developed; the M&S Use (Operations) category addresses the aspects relevant to the 
current application of the M&S to generate the particular M&S results under assessment; and the 
Supporting Evidence category addresses two cross-cutting factors.  In short, the key aspects assessed by 
these eight factors are as follows: 
 
a. M&S Development 
 
(1) Data Pedigree: Is the pedigree (and quality) of the data used to develop the model 
adequate or acceptable? 
 
(2) Verification: Were the models implemented correctly, per their 
requirements/specifications? 
 
(3) Validation: Did the M&S results compare favorably to the referent data, and how 
close is the referent to the RWS? 
 
b. M&S Operations 
 
(1) Input Pedigree: Is the pedigree (and quality) of the data used to setup and run the 
model adequate or acceptable? 
 
(2) Uncertainty Characterization: Is the uncertainty in the current M&S results 
appropriately characterized?  What are the sources of uncertainty in the results 
and how are they propagated through to the results of the analysis? 
 
(3) Results Robustness: How thoroughly are the sensitivities of the current M&S 
results known? 
 
c. Supporting Evidence 
 
(1) M&S History: How similar is the current version of the M&S to previous 
versions, and how similar is the current use of the M&S to previous successful 
uses? 
 
(2) M&S Management: How well managed were the M&S processes and products? 
 
For M&S implemented using a general-purpose software package, some credibility assessment activities 
are two-fold:  (1) those relating to the package itself, and (2) those relating to the implemented M&S.  
The former is sometimes given insufficient attention in the case of M&S using COTS or other third-party 
tools, where certain aspects of M&S Development are neither performed nor managed by the parties 
responsible both for the remainder of M&S Development and for all aspects of M&S Operations.  All the 
verification and validation activities for the tool are evaluated under M&S Development.  Additionally, 
the particular computational model that is constructed using the tool is also evaluated in this category, 
which necessarily includes the pedigree of the data used in M&S development, as well as verification and 
validation of the constructed M&S.  However, the M&S Operations category deals with the credibility 
factors for the application of the particular computational model in the generation of the current M&S 
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results.  This includes the present use of the model (simulation), the analysis, and the reporting of the 
results.  The change and use history of both the tool in general and the particular computational model, 
and the overall management of the M&S processes and products involved in the development, operation, 
and analysis of the computational model, are covered in the Supporting Evidence category. 
 
A synopsis of the credibility factors and level definitions is provided in table 3, Key Aspects of 
Credibility Assessment Levels. 
 
Table 3—Key Aspects of Credibility Assessment Levels 
 M&S Development M&S Use (Operations) Supporting Evidence 
Level Data 
Pedigree 
Verification Validation Input 
Pedigree 
Uncertainty 
Characterization 
Results 
Robustness 
M&S 
History 
M&S 
Process / 
Product 
Management 
4 All data 
known & 
traceable to 
RWS with 
acceptable 
accuracy, 
precision, & 
uncertainty. 
Reliable 
practices 
applied to 
verify the 
end-to-end 
model; all 
model errors 
satisfy 
requirements. 
All M&S 
outputs agree 
with data from 
the RWS over 
the full range 
of operation in 
its real 
operating 
environment. 
All input data 
known & 
traceable to 
RWS with 
acceptable 
accuracy, 
precision, & 
uncertainty. 
Statistical analysis of 
the output 
uncertainty after 
propagation of all 
known sources of 
uncertainty. 
Sensitivities 
known for 
most 
parameters; 
most key 
sensitivities 
identified. 
Nearly 
identical 
model and 
use. 
Controlled 
processes are 
applied; 
measurements 
used for 
process 
improvement. 
3 All data 
known & 
traced to 
sufficient 
referent. 
Significant 
data has 
acceptable 
accuracy, 
precision, & 
uncertainty. 
Formal 
practices 
applied to 
verify the 
end-to-end 
model; all 
important 
errors satisfy 
requirements. 
All key M&S 
outputs agree 
with data from 
the RWS 
operating in a 
representative 
environment. 
All input data 
known & 
traced to 
sufficient 
referent. 
Significant 
input data has 
acceptable 
accuracy, 
precision, & 
uncertainty. 
Uncertainty of 
results are provided 
quantitatively 
through propagation 
of all known 
uncertainty. 
Sensitivities 
known for 
many 
parameters 
including 
many of the 
key 
sensitivities. 
At most 
minor 
changes in 
model and at 
most minor 
differences 
in model 
use. 
Controlled 
processes are 
applied; process 
compliance is 
measured. 
2 Some data 
known & 
formally 
traceable with 
estimated 
uncertainties. 
Documented 
practices 
applied to 
verify all 
model 
features; most 
important 
errors satisfy 
requirements. 
Key M&S 
outputs agree 
with data from 
a sufficiently 
similar 
referent 
system. 
Some input 
data known & 
formally 
traceable with 
estimated 
uncertainties. 
Most sources of 
uncertainty 
identified, expressed 
quantitatively, and 
correctly classified. 
Propagation of the 
uncertainties is 
assessed. 
Sensitivities 
known for a 
few 
parameters. 
Few or no key 
sensitivities 
identified. 
At most 
moderate 
changes in 
model and at 
most 
moderate 
differences 
in model 
use. 
Formal 
processes are 
applied. 
1 Some data 
known and 
informally 
traceable. 
Informal 
practices 
applied to 
verify some 
features of the 
model and 
assess errors. 
Conceptual 
model 
addresses 
problem 
statement and 
agrees with 
available 
referents. 
Some input 
data known 
and 
informally 
traceable. 
Sources of 
uncertainty identified 
and qualitatively 
assessed. 
Qualitative 
estimates only 
for 
sensitivities in 
M&S. 
New model 
or major 
changes in 
model, or 
major 
differences 
in model 
use; but, 
model/chang
es/uses 
documented. 
Informal 
processes are 
applied. 
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 M&S Development M&S Use (Operations) Supporting Evidence 
Level Data 
Pedigree 
Verification Validation Input 
Pedigree 
Uncertainty 
Characterization 
Results 
Robustness 
M&S 
History 
M&S 
Process / 
Product 
Management 
0 Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
 
 
E.4  Level Definitions 
 
This subsection includes an explanation for the factor-level definitions in the updated credibility 
assessment of this revision of this NASA Technical Standard.  In many of the level definitions, 
multiple conditions are stated.  In the levels where multiple conditions are stated, all of them are 
to be met to achieve that level unless they are part of an “or” type listing.  The assessment of 
each factor level is a discrete step function, with no intentions for partial credit at any given 
level. 
 
Note:  The factor assessments are ordinal only, and as such, should not be arithmetically 
manipulated.  Also, as the factors are largely independent, level comparison between factors is 
not intended except that Level 0 indicates insufficient evidence to claim anything higher and 
Level 4 indicates the best possible assessment for that factor. 
 
E.4.1 M&S Development Category 
 
The focus of the factors in the M&S Development category is in producing (developing) a good 
M&S.  This starts with having the appropriate data from which design and development may 
proceed and ends with testing (both verification and validation) from which the adequacy of the 
M&S is determined.  The level definitions for these factors are given in table 4, Level 
Definitions for Factors in the M&S Development Category. 
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Table 4—Level Definitions for Factors in the M&S Development Category 
  M&S Development 
Level Data Pedigree Verification Validation 
4 All data known and fully 
traceable to the RWS. All 
data are acceptable in terms 
of accuracy, precision, and 
uncertainty. 
The model is correctly implemented 
as determined by reliable 
verification practices, which 
evaluate all components, features, 
capabilities, and couplings of the 
end-to-end model. Reliable 
estimation methods are used to 
assess model errors. All model 
errors satisfy program/project 
specified requirements.  
M&S results compare 
favorably to measurements on 
the RWS in its operating 
environment or to results from 
a higher-fidelity M&S that 
satisfies the conditions for 
Level 4. Validation points 
completely span the domain of 
operation for the RWS. 
Favorable comparisons are 
obtained for all response 
quantities. 
3 All data are known and can 
be traced to a sufficiently 
representative referent. All 
significant data are acceptable 
in terms of accuracy, 
precision and uncertainty. 
The model is correctly implemented 
as determined by formal verification 
practices, which evaluate all 
components, features, capabilities, 
and couplings of the end-to-end 
model. Formal methods are used to 
assess model errors. All important 
model errors satisfy 
program/project-specified 
requirements. 
M&S results compare 
favorably to measurements on 
the RWS in a representative 
environment or to results from 
a higher-fidelity M&S that 
satisfies the conditions for 
Level 3. Validation points 
significantly span the domain 
of operation for the RWS. 
Favorable comparisons are 
obtained for all important 
response quantities. 
2 Most data are known and 
traceable to formal 
documentation. Processes to 
establish significant data are 
known. Uncertainties in all 
data are at least estimated. 
The model is correctly implemented 
as determined by documented 
verification practices, which 
evaluate all components, features, 
capabilities, and couplings of the 
model. Documented methods are 
used to assess model errors. Most of 
the important model errors satisfy 
program/project-specified 
requirements. 
M&S results compare 
favorably to measurements 
from a representative system or 
to results from a higher-fidelity 
M&S that satisfies the 
conditions for Level 2. 
Validation points are within the 
domain of operation for the 
RWS. Favorable comparisons 
are obtained for at least some of 
the important response 
quantities. 
1 Some data are known and 
traceable to informal 
documentation. Sources of all 
significant data are known. 
Uncertainties in data may not 
even be estimated. 
Verification is informal, with some 
documentation or evidence of 
completeness/success. 
The model is conceptually 
validated. The problem 
statement (intended use) is 
clearly stated & well-
understood, and the conceptual 
model, requirements, & 
specifications are correct and 
sufficiently address the 
problem. 
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  M&S Development 
Level Data Pedigree Verification Validation 
0 Insufficient evidence. Insufficient evidence. Insufficient evidence. 
 
E.4.1.1 Data Pedigree Factor 
 
The concept of pedigree is included in both the data and input factors of the updated credibility 
assessment and is loosely defined as a traceable record of lineage or heritage.  Data Pedigree 
involves the evaluation of all data used in the development of an M&S, and is formally defined 
as a record of the traceability of data from its source through all aspects of its transmission, 
storage, and processing to its final form used in the development of an M&S.  Any changes from 
the (real-world) source data may be of significance to its pedigree.  Ideally, this record includes 
important quality characteristics of the data at every stage of the process. 
 
Assessment of M&S development data at Level 1 requires at least informal traceability, while 
traceability becomes formal at Level 2 along with the processes for establishing significant data 
and an estimate of its uncertainty.  Attaining Level 3 requires all data to be known and traceable, 
but with only significant or key data to have acceptable accuracy, precision, and uncertainty.  
Level 4 then requires all data to have acceptable accuracy, precision, and uncertainty. 
 
E.4.1.2 Verification Factor 
 
Verification, in essence, is what is done to provide assurance that the conceptual and 
mathematical models are correct, specifications for the computational model are sufficient and 
accurate, and the computational model is correctly implemented. There are two different aspects 
with respect to the latter:  (a) code verification and (b) solution verification. 
 
Code verification employs standard software development techniques, including regression 
testing and unit testing.  The former is the process of testing changes to computational models to 
make sure the older aspects still work with the new changes.  The latter is a procedure used to 
validate that individual units of computational models are working properly.  Ultimately, code 
verification should be accomplished via the use of the end-to-end computational model to ensure 
interactions between the units are not a problem. 
 
Solution verification involves identifying the presence of any numerical and logical errors in the 
model, assessing their impact upon the accuracy of the results, and taking necessary steps (if 
any) to ensure that the impact satisfies any requirements or is otherwise minimized to the extent 
possible.  These errors result from inherent characteristics the computer hardware, underlying 
software, and decisions made by developers/users such as tolerances for iterative convergence or 
discretization (resolution) of the model.  Trade-offs in terms of accuracy and run-time efficiency, 
in such cases, are often unavoidable. 
 
Other key aspects to consider include: (a) the degrees of rigor and formality of the verification 
processes, and (b) how well-established and appropriate the processes are in the context of the 
specific M&S being developed. 
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E.4.1.3 Validation Factor 
 
Validation starts with conceptual validation, i.e., providing the requisite assurance that the 
conceptual and mathematical models are valid.  Once the computation model is available, the 
next step is empirical validation, which is the comparison of M&S results with a referent 
(generally, data from either the RWS or a “representative system”).  In some instances, e.g., for 
the development of so-called “surrogate models,” the referent can be the results obtained from a 
higher-fidelity (and typically computationally expensive) model. 
The Validation factor considers the following aspects when assessing credibility:  (a) the 
similarity between the RWS and the referent, (b) the extent of the domain of M&S validation 
relative to the domain of RWS operation, and (c) the extent to which favorable comparison is 
achieved for all possible model outputs (dependent variables).  Compliance with [M&S 8 (4)] 
ensures specific criteria are defined for what constitutes “favorable comparison.” 
 
Favorable comparison, if obtained, occurs at a “validation point,” which can be thought of as a 
unique set of independent variables (i.e., inputs to the model, corresponding to known or 
controlled conditions for the referent system).  The region enclosing all validation points is 
called the “domain of M&S validation.”  The region enclosing all points at which the RWS has 
operated (or is intended to operate) is called the “domain of RWS operation.”  Each model 
output may have a unique domain of validation, i.e., favorable comparison may not be obtained 
for all model outputs at each and every set of model inputs. 
The comparison between M&S results and the referent data has to consider:  (a) the accuracy of 
the results – for computational models, the magnitude of the numerical difference between the 
mean of the M&S result and the mean of the referent data, and (b) the associated uncertainty, i.e., 
the spread about the means.  To achieve favorable comparison between the M&S results and the 
referent data requires, at a minimum, some overlap between the uncertainty intervals around the 
means.  The comparison may also include sensitivities of the results with respect to 
corresponding independent variables in both model and experiment. 
 
For the Validation factor, an assessment of Level n (n ≥ 2), requires all conditions for Level 1 be 
satisfied, i.e., the model has to be conceptually validated before it is empirically validated. 
 
E.4.2 M&S Use (Operations) Category 
 
The focus of the M&S Use (Operations) category is to assess those factors that most affect the 
results produced when using an M&S.  This starts with having the appropriate data for setup and 
input to the M&S, and continues through to uncertainty characterization and robustness of the 
results.  The level definitions for these factors are given in table 5, Level Definitions for Factors 
in the M&S Use (Operations) Category. 
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Table 5—Level Definitions for Factors in the M&S Use (Operations) Category 
Level Input Pedigree 
Evidence 
Uncertainty 
Characterization Evidence 
Results Robustness Evidence 
4 All input data known and 
fully traceable to the 
RWS. All data are 
acceptable in terms of 
accuracy, precision, and 
uncertainty. 
A statistical analysis (e.g., 
ANOVA) of the output 
uncertainty has been 
performed for all output 
quantities after rigorous and 
validated propagation of all 
known sources of 
uncertainty. Reported results 
may include statistical 
moments, confidence 
intervals, sensitivity 
analysis, etc. 
Sensitivity of the M&S results for the 
RWS is quantitatively known for most 
of the variables and parameters, 
including most, if not all, of the most 
sensitive variables and parameters.  
Sensitivities of many combinations of 
these variables and parameters are also 
quantified. 
3 All input data are known 
and can be traced to a 
sufficiently 
representative referent. 
All significant data are 
acceptable in terms of 
accuracy, precision, and 
uncertainty. 
Quantitative estimates of 
uncertainties have been 
reported for most output 
quantities after a 
propagation of all known 
sources of uncertainty. 
Sensitivity of the M&S results for the 
RWS is quantitatively known for many 
variables and parameters, including 
many of the most sensitive variables 
and parameters. Sensitivities of some 
combinations of these variables and 
parameters are also quantified. 
2 Most input data are 
known and traceable to 
formal documentation. 
Processes to establish 
significant data are 
known. Uncertainties in 
all data are at least 
estimated. 
Most sources of uncertainty 
have been identified, 
expressed quantitatively and 
correctly classified based on 
SME opinions and/or by 
deduction from experimental 
data. Propagation of the 
uncertainty to output 
quantities has been 
addressed by reduced order 
(e.g., monotonic or boundary 
analysis) and/or reduced 
dimension propagation.   
Sensitivity of the M&S results for the 
RWS is quantitatively known for a few 
variables and parameters.  Only a few 
(or none) of the most sensitive 
variables and parameters are identified.  
Sensitivities of combinations of 
variables and parameters are not 
known. 
1 Some input data are 
known and traceable to 
informal documentation. 
Sources of all significant 
input data are known. 
Uncertainties in input 
data may not even be 
estimated. 
Sources of input uncertainty 
have been identified with 
qualitative estimates of the 
uncertainty. Their impact on 
output uncertainties and 
uncertainty propagation have 
not been addressed. 
Sensitivity of M&S results for the RWS 
is estimated by analogy with the 
quantified sensitivity of similar 
problems of interest. 
0 Insufficient evidence. Insufficient evidence. Insufficient evidence. 
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E.4.2.1 Input Pedigree Evidence Factor 
 
Input Pedigree involves the evaluation of all data used as input to an M&S.  It is formally 
defined as a record of the traceability of data from its source through all aspects of its 
transmission, storage, and processing to its final form when using an M&S.  Any changes from 
the (real-world) source data may be of significance to its pedigree.  Ideally, this record includes 
important quality characteristics of the data at every stage of the process. 
 
Assessment of M&S input data at Level 1 requires at least informal traceability, while 
traceability becomes formal at Level 2 along with the processes for establishing significant 
inputs and an estimate of its uncertainty.  Attaining Level 3 requires all input data to be known 
and traceable, but with only significant or key input data to have acceptable accuracy, precision, 
and uncertainty.  Level 4 then requires all input data to have acceptable accuracy, precision, and 
uncertainty. 
 
E.4.2.2 Uncertainty Characterization Factor 
 
Uncertainty Characterization includes the identification of uncertainty sources and the 
qualification or quantification of uncertainty in the current M&S results. The important aspects 
of Uncertainty Characterization are (a) the sources of uncertainty in the input variables and 
parameters, (b) the numerical errors incumbent in model implementation mechanisms (e.g., 
computational/math models), and (c) the propagation of the uncertainty to M&S outputs. These 
may have variable degrees quality.  Also, the results of (c) are directly impacted by both (a) and 
(b).  
 
At Level 1, some sources of uncertainty are identified in the M&S with qualitative estimates of 
their uncertainty; however, their impact on the output uncertainty and uncertainty propagation 
have not been addressed.  At Level 2, most sources of uncertainty are identified.  These sources 
are also expressed quantitatively and are correctly classified (e.g., aleatory vs. epistemic) based 
on either SME opinions and/or by deduction from experimental data.  Propagation of the 
uncertainty to some M&S results are addressed by reduced order analysis (e.g., interval analysis) 
or reduced dimension propagation based on a sensitivity study.  At Level 3, estimates of 
uncertainties are reported for most output quantities after propagation of all known sources of 
uncertainty.  Propagation at this level is performed by using an appropriate (e.g., probabilistic 
analysis, evidence theory, fuzzy logic, etc.) and comprehensive (e.g., Monte Carlo sampling) 
approach.  At Level 4, a statistical analysis (e.g., ANOVA) of the output uncertainty is 
performed for all output quantities after rigorous and validated propagation of all known sources 
of uncertainty.  Reported results may include statistical moments, confidence intervals, 
sensitivity analysis, etc. 
 
E.4.2.3 Results Robustness Evidence Factor 
 
Results Robustness is the determination of how thoroughly the sensitivities of the current M&S 
results (to the variables and parameters of the M&S) are known.  Simulations aim to imitate the 
real world or a proposed real world through execution of a (computational) model.  Ideally, the 
imitated system behaves like the RWS (i.e., with acceptable accuracy and precision, and with 
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similar sensitivities).  That is, if the RWS is sensitive to certain variables or parameters, then the 
M&S results should be similarly sensitive.  The purpose of considering robustness is to garner an 
understanding of the sensitivity of the RWS to potential fluctuations, either individually or in 
combinations, in the variables and parameters of the system.   
 
As a matter of clarification: 
 
• Validation Testing yields an understanding of: 
 
o The accuracy and precision of the M&S with respect to the RWS. 
 
o How well the sensitivity of the M&S matches that of the RWS, including if M&S 
sensitivities are similar (in magnitude and direction) to the RWS. 
• Sensitivity Analysis determines the stability (robustness) of the scenario(s) under analysis 
with the knowledge of M&S sensitivities as determined in Validation. 
 
The key sensitivities are defined as parameters and variables shown to produce large changes in 
results with relatively small perturbations to input. 
 
What constitutes “few,” “many,” and “most” in Levels 2, 3, and 4 cannot be generally specified 
for all situations. As a guideline, “few” should mean the sensitivity of, say, less than 20 percent 
of the potential variables and parameters is known; “many” should mean the sensitivity of, say, 
between 20 and 50 percent is known; at Level 4, “most” implies the majority (i.e., >50 percent) 
of all parameters and variables is known, including all of the most sensitive variables and 
parameters. 
 
E.4.3  Supporting Evidence Category 
 
The focus of the Supporting Evidence Category is to assess those factors that cut across both the 
development and use of an M&S, but still affect, though possibly indirectly, the credibility of the 
M&S results.  The factors include M&S History, including both the change history as well as the 
use history of the M&S, and M&S Process/Product Management, which assesses the formality of 
control applied to the M&S’s processes and products.  The level definitions for these factors are 
given in table 6, Level Definitions for Factors in the Supporting Evidence Category. 
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Table 6—Level Definitions for Factors in the Supporting Evidence Category 
Level M&S History M&S Process/Product Management 
4 
Model changes have stabilized to 
inconsequential levels and proposed 
use is within established norms for 
the model.  
Measurements, including customer/user 
feedback, are used to improve both the M&S 
process and products. 
3 
Model has at most (no more than) 
minor changes from previously 
used versions, and proposed use is 
in interpolated regions of validation 
points. 
The formally established process is 
rigorously controlled and followed. 
Compliance with the process is formally 
documented. Measurements of process and 
product compliance are made and 
documented. CM of M&S products is 
rigorously applied. 
2 
Model has at most (no more than) 
moderate changes from previously 
used versions, and proposed use is 
at most (no more than) moderately 
different from previous uses. 
Roles and responsibilities are defined in the 
context of an M&S process that is formally 
documented and approved. Requirements for 
M&S products are formally documented and 
approved. CM of M&S products is 
established and applied using formal 
methods. 
1 
Model is new or has major changes 
from previously used versions, or 
proposed use has major differences 
from previous uses; however, the 
model, changes, and uses are 
documented. 
Roles and responsibilities are defined in the 
context of an M&S process that is informally 
documented. Requirements for M&S 
products are informally documented. CM of 
M&S products is established and applied 
using informal methods. 
0 Insufficient evidence. Insufficient evidence. 
 
E.4.3.1 M&S History Factor 
 
The M&S History factor implicitly includes two main elements (or sub-factors):  change history 
and use history. This factor provides an assessment of the “heritage” of the M&S from these two 
viewpoints. 
 
The change history sub-factor assesses the degree of changes of the current model relative to 
versions used in previous applications.  For the highest level, the model changes are “relatively 
minor.” 
 
The use history sub-factor assesses the degree to which the current proposed or actual use of the 
M&S is identical to previous uses.  For the highest level, the “proposed or actual use is nearly 
identical” to previous uses. 
 
For the M&S History factor, an assessment of Level n (n ≥ 1), requires all conditions for Levels 
1 through (n-1) be satisfied. 
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E.4.3.2 M&S Process/Product Management Factor 
 
The term M&S Process/Product Management is used to describe the extent to which an M&S 
effort exhibits the characteristics of work product management; process definition; process 
measurement; process control; process change; continuous improvement, including CM; and 
M&S support and maintenance.  The levels are similar to those for most process maturity 
models.  This factor assesses how rigorously the processes and products of an M&S are managed 
and maintained as directed by the NASA report “A Renewed Commitment to Excellence: An 
Assessment of the NASA Agency-wide Applicability of the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board Report” (NTRS-PB2005-100968).  Assessments at Level 1 and higher require evidence 
addressing each of these topics. 
 
For the M&S Process/Product Management factor, an assessment of Level n (n ≥ 3) requires the 
conditions for Level 2 be satisfied. 
 
E.5  Reporting the Credibility Assessment and Sufficiency Thresholds 
 
E.5.1   Reporting the Credibility Assessment 
 
The reporting of the credibility assessment is different from the Baseline version of this NASA 
Technical Standard in that only individual factor assessments are reported without any attempt at 
aggregation.  Additionally, there is no weighting of sub-factor evaluations required.  This 
simplifies and clarifies reporting, makes it less abstract, and eliminates the problems/limitations 
associated with non-numerical aggregation. 
 
A few methods were used in the reporting of M&S results credibility since its inception in the 
Baseline version.  Two are provided here as examples, with corresponding examples including 
Sufficiency Thresholds provided in the following section.  The first two methods, the bar graph 
(figure 3, Bar Graph of Credibility Assessment) and the spider plot or radar plot (figure 4, Spider 
Plot or Radar Plot of Credibility Assessment), really display the same information, but in 
graphically different forms. 
 
These methods readily show each factor’s assessment and provide a basis for discussion of the 
background of each. 
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Figure 3—Bar Graph of Credibility Assessment 
 
 
Figure 4—Spider Plot or Radar Plot of Credibility Assessment 
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E.5.2 Reporting Sufficiency Thresholds 
 
Recommendations “a” through “c” from section 4.3.7 specify information relevant to credibility 
sufficiency thresholds. 
 
a. Should set credibility sufficiency threshold levels for each factor as described in 
Appendix E. 
 
b. Should justify and document the credibility assessment for each of the factors 
referenced in [M&S 31]. 
 
c. Should gain additional insight into the credibility of M&S results by applying the 
process in this section to determine and report any gaps between the achieved scores and the 
program/project-defined threshold scores for each of the factors.   
 
The concept behind these recommendations is that program/project management, technical 
authorities, stakeholders, or customers are encouraged to set credibility goals, or thresholds, for 
an M&S effort to meet.  During the course of M&S planning, development, and use, the 
developers and users can then allocate the appropriate amount of effort to achieving those 
thresholds.  Reporting the factor assessments with their associated thresholds, as in figure 5, Bar 
Graph of Credibility Assessment with Thresholds, and figure 6, Spider Plot or Radar Plot of 
Credibility Assessment with Thresholds, provides an additional basis for credibility discussions.  
Note, as illustrated in this notional example, the possibility exists of either not reaching (e.g., 
M&S History and M&S Product/Process Management) or of exceeding (e.g., Input Pedigree) the 
defined threshold. 
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Figure 5—Bar Graph of Credibility Assessment with Thresholds 
 
 
 
Figure 6—Spider Plot or Radar Plot of Credibility Assessment with Thresholds 
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APPENDIX F 
 
M&S Life Cycle 
 
F.1 Purpose  
 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide an explanation of the M&S life cycle.  
 
The life cycle of a model or simulation, like that of any system, has two general parts: M&S 
development, which includes M&S initiation, concept development, M&S design, M&S 
construction, and M&S testing; and M&S application, which includes use (or operation) and 
M&S archiving (including the associated artifacts, products, and analysis performed during a 
specific use).  These phases are summarized in figure 7, M&S Life Cycle. 
 
 
Figure 7—M&S Life Cycle 
 
The need for a model or simulation starts the modeling and simulation life cycle and can occur at 
any point in a program’s or project’s life cycle. This need for an M&S starts the M&S initiation 
phase, where the RWS that needs to be modeled and simulated and the information or results that 
are required of the M&S are identified, and the intended use of the M&S starts to be defined. The 
intended use is further defined during the concept development phase, where the aspects of the 
RWS that need to be included in the M&S and the abstractions and assumptions required to 
implement the M&S are identified.  In addition, the objectives and level of detail required in or 
from the M&S, and acceptance criteria to determine M&S sufficiency, are identified.  The 
intended use typically becomes more refined throughout M&S development, leading to iterations 
in the M&S development phase to match the changes in intended use. 
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As the M&S moves into the M&S design phase, a conceptual model and other M&S 
requirements or specifications are developed that describe the physical behavior and interactions 
of the RWS from which a working M&S can be made.  This conceptual model is validated 
against the aspects and behavior of the RWS within the areas of interest as defined by the 
intended use during the conceptual validation phase.  Once the conceptual model (or M&S 
design) is validated, the working M&S is constructed.  The relationships between the M&S 
design (conceptual model), the working M&S, and the RWS reality of interest are illustrated in 
figure 8, M&S Process Relationships (adapted from Sargent, 1979).  Additional details about the 
M&S Process is in NASA-HDBK-7009, section 4.5.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 8—M&S Process Relationships 
 
During model testing, verification shows the working model adequately represents, and/or 
behaves like, what is identified in the conceptual model or model design.  On the other hand, the 
intent of empirical validation is to show the working model adequately represents, and/or 
behaves like, the RWS or an alternate referent by a more direct comparison.  This testing 
identifies the model’s limits of operation, i.e., where the model is known to work correctly (i.e., 
verified and validated).  At the end of model testing, the model’s capabilities, assumptions, and 
limits of operation are documented and assessed with respect to acceptance criteria to determine 
the permissible uses of the model.  Once model testing is successfully completed, the model is 
released, along with documentation of the model’s capability and domain of permissible use, 
ending model development. 
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During the use (or operations) phase, the model may or may not be used by those who developed 
it.   In both cases, and especially the latter case, the use of a model starts with an assessment of 
whether or not the proposed use of the model sufficiently matches the permissible use.  If the 
proposed use is acceptable, the model is then used to obtain the results of interest. 
 
 If the proposed model use does not meet the defined permissible use, the proposed use will 
either be rejected or possibly allowed with the appropriate restrictions, caveats, or placarding 
required.  Each application of the model restarts the model use/operation with an assessment of 
permissible uses against the needs of that specific proposed use. 
 
The credibility of the results from the particular use of the model is assessed using the credibility 
assessment requirements of this NASA Technical Standard.  The results and credibility are 
reported to the program/project customers for use in their decision-making about the RWS.  
Information regarding the actual use and the specific version of the model used are documented 
and archived. 
 
 
